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ABSTRACT 
 
Malaysia has embarked on highway privatization program starting from 1985 with 
the launch of its privatization policy. The privatization method of choice for 
highway development has been the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) method where 
the government of Malaysia allow the private sector to develop the highway and 
in return gives them toll charging rights. Based on this method, Malaysia has 
succeeded in building 30 highways forming a complete network of 1600 
kilometres in length connecting almost all part of the Malaysian Peninsular. The 
number of projects implemented in Malaysia suggests that there is a particular 
way of method of implementation being applied in Malaysia which has made it 
successful in this endeavour. Further study shows that even though Malaysia is 
successful in developing its highway networks trough BOT implementation 
process, some of its particular implementation method is not positively 
contributing the overall success of the process. The selected traits of no specific 
BOT law in place, propensity towards unsolicited proposal and adoption of over 
protective measures for concession company are studied and compared with other 
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countries. The result shows that in the case of Malaysia, the success of highway 
development using BOT method is not comprehensive in all elements. 
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CHAPTER 1:INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background  
 
A good, interconnected road network system is a requirement for any country 
in the world. Road networks will enable the movement of people and goods efficiently 
and this ability is crucial as it in turn enable economic activities such as trade.  As a 
nation develops, so will its need for efficient road transportation. Increase in traffic and 
trade volume among others leads to the need for an increase in traffic efficiency. The 
roads need to be wider, with more lanes to cater for higher volume of traffic and in the 
same time longer to connect more places and ultimately shorten the travelling time. In 
order to fulfill these needs, a nation has to upgrade its road networks to highway 
networks. These supersized road networks will enable greater volume of human and 
material movement with higher efficiency across the land. Highways are the backbone 
of a country’s transportation system (Maw, Nakamura and Okamura, 2007). Highways, 
together with other economic infrastructure like bridges, ports and airports, are 
considered part of the public capital. As such, the effects of public capital (including 
highway) towards economy have been the focus of several studies before. For example, 
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Aschauer (1989) in a study utilising a production-function approach for the US between 
1949 and 1985 discovered that close to four percent increase in multifactor productivity 
is achievable with a ten percent increase in public capital stock while another study by 
Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992) resulted with the finding that greater output of state 
economies is attainable with larger expenditures spent on highways.   
Infrastructure provision (including highway) is a large scale endeavour which 
require a massive amount of budget, planning and administration. Agrawal, Gupta, & 
Gupta (2011) stated that “ Infrastructure projects are complex, capital intensive, having 
long gestation period and involve multiple risks to the project participants”(p.52). Due 
to this, the task of providing infrastructure is traditionally that of the government as the 
government is able to utilize its planning and administrative capabilities in undertaking 
infrastructure development. According to Bonnafous and Jensen (2004) public 
authorities were generally in charge of financing and building new infrastructures. 
However, infrastructure development is also financially taxing to the government. That 
is why even when infrastructure development has a positive effect on the economy, no 
government can afford to concentrate all its resources towards the provision of 
infrastructure. Any government in the world will have to balance between the need for 
developing infrastructure such as road and highways with other requirement such as 
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providing healthcare and education. The economic rule of resource scarcity will limit its 
capability to do so. Government’s income is usually derived from taxation and as such 
increasing taxation is usually the main way it can increase its’ revenue. Levy (1996) 
stated that “Infrastructure development has been the responsibility of public agencies. 
And taxes collected by local and central government have provided the funds by which 
infrastructure projects have been built” (p. viii). However, raising taxes is not something 
that can be easily done. Levy (1996) further added “citizen resistance is increasing to 
the imposition of added taxes as a means of obtaining more money for a variety of 
government projects” (p.11). Many governments have come to realize that the tax base 
alone cannot fund the enormous needs for infrastructure (UNECE, 2008). Therefore, the 
government usually faces a financial shortcoming or a funding gap in infrastructure 
development. 
The government or the public sector is socially and economically obligated to 
provide highways and other infrastructures in a nation. However, the private sector 
shares none of this obligation. The private sector is mainly concerned with the profit 
making aspect in any task it undertakes. Its source of revenue is not from taxation and 
thus it is not bound by limitation faced by the public sector. By creating a cooperative 
arrangement for the participation of the private sector in infrastructure provision, 
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something which has been traditionally the role of public sector, the public sector can 
tap into the resources of the private sector. This synergy between the public and private 
sector in infrastructure development will enable the public to utilize the resources of the 
private sector, in term of finance and efficiency, to overcome the problem of the funding 
gap. On the other hand, this cooperation will allow the private sector to enter into 
infrastructure development. This arrangement of public and private sector’s cooperation 
is called Public Private Partnership or PPP. 
The concept of partnership between public and private sector is a concept 
taking many forms of arrangement. Essentially, it is an arrangement by which private 
parties participate in, or provide support for the provision of infrastructure-base services 
(Ng & Loosemore, 2006). In many countries worldwide, the provision of public 
infrastructure and related services are carried out using a Public-Private Partnership 
(PPP) approach (Olson, Guthrie and Humphrey, 1998). PPP covers many forms of 
arrangement and BOT is one of them. Many developed and developing nations are now 
utilizing PPP arrangements such as BOT as a solution for the problem they face in the 
provision of infrastructure and services (Liu and Yamamoto, 2009). 
As a country moving towards developed state, Malaysia has been embarking 
on the effort of building highway networks interconnecting all of its states, especially in 
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the Peninsular Malaysia. Malaysia is strategically located between Thailand in its North 
and Singapore in its South, therefore a complete network of highways traversing from 
the North to the South will allow it to fully capitalize on the economic potential of its 
geographical location. Like other nations, Malaysia too faced the problem of increasing 
deficit in the public sector, it jumped onto the privatization bandwagon with a national 
shift towards utilization of private sector’s resources for development (Yaacob and 
Naidu, 1997). Through Built Operate Transfer (BOT) model, the Malaysian government 
has succeeded in building major highways interconnecting all parts of West Malaysia 
(Alfan, 2007). The model used is the appointed concession company will build the 
highway and will operate it along an agreed concession period. In return, the company 
will be allowed to collect toll from the highway users.  
Malaysia’s experience with BOT in highway development has been largely 
considered as a success (Handley, 1997). However, there are also contradicting views on 
Malaysia’s BOT highway such as the preference for no competitive bidding which 
reflects the lack of transparency (Hensley and White, 1993) and public disagreement 
around the issue of toll charges and revisions (Aziz, 2002). This myriad of view on 
Malaysia’s BOT highways shows Malaysia has both managed to successfully 
implement BOT arrangement for its highway development (considering the number and 
6 
 
length of operational highways) and at the same time, not being able to adapt certain 
aspect in its framework that causes criticisms of its implementation. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 Malaysia has aggressively embraced the path of privatization since it launched 
the privatization program in 1985. Especially in the field of infrastructure provision, 
more specifically on highway development, Malaysia has adapted BOT procurement 
scheme for the development of all its highway projects since. The success of building 
25 interstate and urban highways amounting to 1634 kilometers
1
 length with several 
more in the pipeline shows that Malaysia has managed to fully utilize BOT for her 
highway needs. This feat is remarkable considering that Malaysia is a developing 
country and the privatization program has only started not more than three decades ago. 
Based on the success of Malaysia, this research is undertaken with the goal of 
answering these research questions : 
I. How does Malaysia implement its highway development projects using BOT 
method and can this method be viewed as a process? 
II. How does these aspects of Malaysian BOT highway development process (the 
                                                     
1 Data from Malaysia Highway Authority 
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lack of specific PPP or BOT law, propensity of private sector to initiate project, 
handling of unsolicited proposals and government guarantee against 
concessionaire risks) differ from the process of BOT highway development of 
other countries in the world and? 
To answer the first research question, the research will study the development of 
highway projects in Malaysia through the viewpoint of a process. The Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary (2010) in one of its definition of process defines it as “a series of actions or 
operations conducing to an end”. According to BusinessDictionary.com (2011) process 
is a “Sequence of interdependent and linked procedures which, at every stage, consume 
one or more resources (employee time, energy, machines, and money) to convert inputs 
(data, material, parts, etc.) into outputs
2
. These outputs then serve as inputs for the next 
stage until a known goal or end result is reached”. Therefore, to analyze the BOT 
highway development in Malaysia in a clear and logical manner, the BOT highway 
development is viewed as a process with the procedures (steps taken from the initiation, 
selection, award, construction and completion of the highway projects), resources 
(parties involved and their responsibilities), and inputs examined in detail. By utilizing 
the process viewpoint, the second research question can be answered in a precise 
                                                     
2 http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/process.html 
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manner whereas the process of highway development using BOT method in Malaysia 
can be compared with the similar process in other countries especially by focusing on 
selected procedures in the process which shows the most differences. Additionally, by 
examining and answering the two research questions, the research will also be able to 
understand what the reasons of the differences are and how these reasons affect the 
process of BOT highway development in Malaysia. 
 
1.3  Objective of the Thesis 
 The BOT model used in Malaysia’s highway projects has its own unique 
characteristics which differ from the accepted practice in some other countries. Even 
though Malaysia’s BOT model has succeeded in building extensive highway networks, 
it is crucial to understand the differences between it and the other model used in other 
similar highway projects in other countries and how these differences have affected the 
BOT implementation itself in terms of cost, time and project delivery. Furthermore, 
available literatures suggested that the right framework and initiatives must be taken by 
both parties in BOT to ensure its success. Thus, this thesis is written with the ultimate 
objective of studying and comparing the implementation and the difference in 
implementation processes in BOT model in highway development projects between 
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Malaysia and other countries based on several selected aspect of Malaysia’s BOT 
highway development.  
 
1.4  Significance of the Research 
Outcome of this research is hoped to reveal the differences between the 
implementation methods of BOT in Malaysia and other countries based on selected 
implementation aspect. By recognizing the differences, advantages on these differences 
that are beneficial in various aspects can be identified and applied towards the 
betterment of BOT implementation in Malaysia. 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
This research is a qualitative research with the objectives of gathering available 
data and material pertaining to the implementation of BOT highway development in 
Malaysia and analyzing the characteristics of it. The research will be entirely based on 
existing facts and will be executed through the approach of an informational paper and 
will be conducted through qualitative method using comparative analysis. Ragin (2000) 
stated that using the set-theoretic character of comparative analysis, this method will 
derive from its own case-oriented nature, in this case by means of comparing selected 
aspects from the implementation process of BOT for highway development in Malaysia 
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(namely the lack of specific PPP or BOT law, propensity of private sector to initiate 
project, handling of unsolicited proposals and revenue guarantee to concessionaire) with 
practices of other countries based on available information. Information will be gathered 
from existing books, journals, articles, publications and other sources available both 
online and offline. For information pertaining to Malaysian BOT highway, interviews 
were conducted with officers from the Public Private Partnership Unit of The Prime 
Minister’s Department of Malaysia and Ministry Of works Malaysia. Findings of these 
methods will later be studied and presented and conclusion will be derived from them. 
 
1.6 Limitation of the research  
 To study in depth of the implementation method of BOT highway development 
in Malaysia is quite a challenge due to several factors. First being that the subject itself 
is immensely complex and involves many dimensions such as politic and administration. 
Some matters concerning tolled highway development in Malaysia are still considered 
as classified matter. This is further compounded by the fact that to get a thorough view 
on Malaysia’s BOT highways, information must be gathered from both the public and 
private sector whereas the public sector itself consisted of several government agencies. 
Based on these conditions, it has been quite difficult for me to obtain the information 
needed for this dissertation. Additionally, for information on other countries’ BOT 
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highway projects, I had to rely only on available resources online and offline. Thus, this 
research substantially depended on secondary sources in the form of books, journals, 
newspapers and internet. Admittedly, these constraints have made it especially difficult 
for the researcher to produce a meaningful research. Furthermore, this researcher is also 
constrained by his lack of experience in conducting such research. All of these factors 
have contributed to the researcher not being able to accomplish commendable standard 
for this study. However, despite all these limitations, it is hoped that this research will 
contribute to the body of knowledge available on the subject of Malaysia’s BOT 
highway development.  
 
1.7  Organization of Thesis 
 The structure of this thesis is it is organised into five chapters. Chapter one 
briefly introduce the privatization of highway through BOT scheme and its 
implementation in Malaysia. Chapter two reviews available past literatures on the 
concept of PPP and BOT and related aspect of its implementation in Malaysia’s 
highway developments. Based on the assessed literatures, a framework of study is 
presented. In Chapter three, detailed analysis on how BOT highway project is 
undertaken in Malaysia is presented from start to finish with attention being given to 
certain characteristics. In Chapter four, certain traits of Malaysia’s BOT highway project 
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implementation highlighted in chapter three will be analysed and compared with 
corresponding traits from various countries’ BOT projects. Finally, in chapter five, 
conclusion of the thesis will be provided by discussing the findings of this thesis. The 
logic of arranging this thesis in this manner is to show the objective of this research, its 
background and the available literatures and knowledge around it, the reason for 
Malaysia’s decision to engage in BOT highway development process in term of its 
history and development need, the process undertaken by Malaysia and how procedures 
in that process compares to other countries and lastly to analyse Malaysia’s experience 
in that process. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1   Introduction 
 This chapter explains the main concept of Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
which encompasses the Build Operate Transfer (BOT) method, the crux of this research, 
through the compilation and review of various available literature resources. 
Furthermore, literatures on BOT implementation in highway development in Malaysia 
are also reviewed to get a clearer picture of what has already been studied about it and 
how this research can complement to the available body of knowledge on this topic. The 
importance of this chapter is that it defines the major concepts of the subject matter of 
this thesis and provides a conceptual background for the in depth discussion and 
analysis about BOT highway development in Malaysia in chapter 3 and 4. 
 
2.2 Introduction of PPP Concept 
  Public Private Partnership (PPP) in infrastructure development has been 
viewed as an alternative solution towards the problem of public sector’s shortage of 
fund and capacity to deliver infrastructure provision effectively. BOT method is one of 
the specific arrangements under the umbrella term of PPP. The increasing number of 
highway and other infrastructure projects using the BOT arrangement all over the world 
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has resulted in various literatures written about it. Some literatures were also written on 
various aspects of Malaysia’s highway projects developed using BOT arrangement. As 
this research is aimed specifically at studying the method of implementation of BOT 
highway development in Malaysia, review on the literatures available both online and 
offline on PPP, BOT and BOT (and privatisation) of highway development in Malaysia 
is undertaken. Furthermore, summary and analysis on these literatures is conducted.   
 
2. 3 Definition and concept of PPP 
 The concept if Public Private Partnership or PPP is fundamentally one which 
involve the public sector and private sector working together in various type of 
arrangements in delivering or provision of public infrastructure or services. However, in 
available literatures, it has been stated that giving specific definition of PPP that is 
suitable in all forms and aspects of its implementation is not an easy task. Supporting 
this argument, several literatures have expressed the difficulty of giving a definition to 
PPP. Weihe (2006) stated that PPP is a concept that is debatable and not well described. 
Weihe added that “often the definitions put forward are so open-ended and inclusive 
that they do not clarify much of the confusion that exists around the PPP concept” 
(Weihe, 2006: 3). According to Ziekow and Windoffer (as cited in Arnold and Kehl, 
2010) the difficulty in defining PPP is among others, caused by the complicatedness and 
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versatility of the concept, usually involving various aspects of it. Breaking down the 
term PPP itself will show three main components which made up the whole concept. 
While public and private can easily be defined as the public sector (government) and the 
private sector, partnership is a concept that requires a better understanding. This is 
important as the essential concept of Public Private Partnership is that of a partnership. 
The World Bank (1998) defined partnership as "a collaborative relationship between 
entities to work toward shared objectives through a mutually agreed division of labour." 
One of the definitions of partnership according to The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 
(2010) is "a relationship resembling a legal partnership and usually involving close 
cooperation between parties having specified and joint rights and responsibilities". 
According to UNDP
3, “the term public-private partnership (PPP) is used to describe a 
spectrum of possible relationships between the government (the public sector) and other 
organisations that are not government (the private sector) to carry out a project or 
provide a service”.  
In academic and scholarly literature, the definition of PPP varies between one 
literature to the other. Several points of view pertaining to the concept of relationship in 
PPP emerged; with three most eminent are that of PPP as a relationship of client-service 
                                                     
3 http://pppue.undp.2margraf.com/en/index.htm 
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provider, PPP as a form of cooperation or collaboration between the two sectors and 
PPP as a contractual arrangement. The first conceptual definition of PPP is that it is a 
relationship or client-supplier or seller-purchaser in which the private sector plays 
the role of service provider to the client (public sector). OECD supported this 
definition of PPP as follows: 
“… an agreement between the government and one or more private partners 
(which may include the operators and the financers) according to which the 
private partners deliver the service in such a manner that the service delivery 
objectives of the government are aligned with the profit objectives of the 
private partners and where the effectiveness of the alignment depends on a 
sufficient transfer of risk to the private partners (OECD, 2008, p. 17).  
Ng and Loosemore (2006) described PPP as “essentially an arrangement by which 
private parties participate in, or provide support for the provision of infrastructure-base 
services”. They asserted that basically, by this definition, as opposed to the traditional 
arrangement in which the public sector procure the infrastructure asset, the public sector 
in PPP is procuring a sequence of services (planning, design, construction etc) from the 
private sector; with the final objective of procuring infrastructure asset, and the 
stipulation of the services are ascertained in a mutually agreed service agreement. 
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Ter-Minassian (2006) stated that PPP is an “arrangements where the private sector 
supplies infrastructure assets and services that traditionally have been provided by the 
Government….stress long-term service delivery rather than asset creation; services can 
be provided to the government or directly to final consumers”. Bashiri, Ebrahimi, 
Fazlali, Hosseini, Jamal, & Salehvand, (2010) in further support of this notion defined 
PPP as:  
“a service contract between a public authority and a private sector 
concessionaire, where the public authority pays the concessionaire to deliver 
infrastructure and related services, Typically, the concessionaire, who builds 
the infrastructure asset, is financially responsible for its condition and 
performance throughout the asset lifetime, or the duration of the agreement, or 
it describes a government service or private business venture which is funded 
and operated through a partnership of government and one or more private 
sector companies.” (Bashiri, Ebrahimi, Fazlali, Hosseini, Jamal, & Salehvand, 
2010:5) 
The view of PPP as a relationship of client-service provider is further supported by 
Leidel & Alfen, (2009) which stated that in the definition of PPP, there is a broad 
spectrum of organization for which the public sector’s obligations are contracted out to 
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private (commercial) partner and both parties jointly accept the risk involved with the 
objective of achieving the wanted results, especially in public policy sectors. Schmidt & 
Moisa (2004) offered a slightly different definiton, in which in PPP; private sector is 
taking the role of service provider for services normally associated with the public 
sector. 
The second conceptual definition of PPP is that it is a cooperation or 
collaboration between the two sectors. There are several proponents of this definition, 
among them Liu and Yamamoto (2009) who defined PPP as a form of cooperation 
between public and private sector; a partnership model rather than a purchaser-seller 
relationship. In their word, PPP is “a form of collaboration between the public and 
private sectors for the purpose of providing public services which have been 
traditionally provided only by the public sector”( Liu and Yamamoto, 2009: 223). This 
view of a partnership concept of PPP is also embraced by The Agency for Public Private 
Partnership, Republic of Croatia
4
 in its definition of PPP as follows: 
“Public-private partnerships are just what the name implies, partnership 
between private and public partners whereby the resources, risks and rewards 
of both the public partner and private company are combined to provide greater 
                                                     
4
 http://www.ajpp.hr/home-page/frequently-asked-questions.aspx 
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efficiency, better access to capital, and improved compliance with a range of 
government regulations regarding the environment and workplace”. 
The concept of PPP as a close cooperation with mutual objective is also shared by 
Grimsey and Lewis (2004) who defined PPP as “a risk-sharing relationship based on a 
shared aspiration between the public sector and one or more partners from the private 
and/or voluntary sectors to deliver a publicly agreed outcome and/or public service” 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2004: x). This view of reciprocity or interdependency between 
public and private sector in PPP is supported by Kooiman (2003) which characterized 
PPP as a relationship of combined and collective administration, involving the 
participation of both parties : ‘‘Such interactions between public and private, expressed 
in concrete forms of public-private collaboration or co-operation, are often referred to as 
PPPs’’ (Kooiman, 2003: 102). The idea of cooperation and mutual governance in PPP 
arrangement is further supported by Klijn and Teisman (2002) in which in PPP, both the 
public and private sector work together as a cohesive unit in a collaborative relationship, 
rather than client-employer arrangement. In their own word, PPP is “ a cooperation 
between public and private actors with a durable character in which actors develop 
mutual products and/or services and in which risk, costs, and benefits are shared” (Klijn 
and Teisman, 2004).    
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The Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships
5
 supported the concept 
of cooperation in its definition of PPP as follows “A cooperative venture between the 
public and private sectors, built on the expertise of each partner, that best meets clearly 
defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of resources, risks and rewards”.  
This definition is also mirrored by The Efficiency Unit of The Government of Hong 
Kong which expressed PPP as “arrangements where the public and private sectors both 
bring their complementary skills to a project, with varying levels of involvement and 
responsibility, for the purpose of providing public services or projects
6”. The German 
Federal Department of Transportation, Construction and Real Estate (BMVBW) in the 
“Federal Report on PPP in Public Real Estate, Part I: Guideline” published in 2003 (as 
cited in Alfen et al., 2009) gave the official definition of PPP as  
“The term PPP refers to a long-term, contractually regulated cooperation 
between the public and private sector for the efficient fulfillment of public 
tasks in combining the necessary resources (e.g. knowhow, operational funds, 
capital, personnel) of the partners and distributing existing project risks 
appropriately according to the risk management competence of the project 
partners.” ( Alfen et al., 2009: 4) 
                                                     
5
 http://www.pppcouncil.ca/resources/about-ppp/definitions.html 
6 http://www.eu.gov.hk/english/psi/psi_ppp/psi_ppp_over/psi_ppp_over.html 
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Mitchell-Weaver and Manning (1991) views PPP as a compendium of conceptional 
relations involving the private and public sector. Further support of the notion of 
cooperative relationship in PPP can be found in the writings of Kolzow (1994) which 
defines PPP as an organizational framework between the public and the private sector in 
which both have a mutual obligation towards achieving shared objectives which have 
been collectively decided and agreed upon. Skelcher (2005) also supported the idea of 
some form of mutually beneficial cooperation in PPP. In his word “PPPs combine the 
resources of governments with those of private agents (business or not for-profit bodies) 
in order to deliver societal goals” (Skelcher, 2005: 347). To Van Ham & Koppenjan 
(2001), the concept of PPP is that of a “cooperation of some sort of durability between 
public and private actors in which they jointly develop products and services and share 
risks, costs and resources which are connected with these products (Van Ham & 
Koppenjan, 2001:598). 
The third concept that has been used to define PPP is that of contractual 
relationship between the public and private sector. The National Council for 
Public-Private Partnership’s7 definition of PPP supported this concept of contractual 
relationship. Its definition of PPP is as “a contractual agreement between a public 
                                                     
7 http://ncppp.org/howpart/index.shtml 
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agency (federal, state or local) and a private sector entity. They added that through this 
agreement, the skills and assets of each sector (public and private) are shared in 
delivering a service or facility for the use of the general public. In addition to the 
sharing of resources, each party shares in the risks and rewards potential in the delivery 
of the service and/or facility”. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) in 
defining PPP stated that “…are essentially contractual arrangements between the public 
and private sectors that allow a single private entity to assume significant control of, and 
risk for, multiple elements of a project, including design, construction, financing, 
operation and maintenance
8”.  ADB (2006) defined PPP as “ a contractual partnership 
between the public and private sector agencies, specifically targeted towards financing, 
designing, implementing and operating infrastructure facilities and services that are 
traditionally provided by the public sector”(p.15). This definition is also embraced by 
UNECE which defines PPP as:  
“innovative methods used by the public sector to contract with the private 
sector, who bring their capital and their ability to deliver projects on time and 
to budget, while the public sector retains the responsibility to provide these 
services to the public in a way that benefits the public and delivers economic 
                                                     
8 http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/pppwave/08.htm 
23 
 
development and an improvement in the quality of life”. (UNECE, 2008:1) 
 Although there are many definitions of PPP, some literatures agreed that some 
characteristics can be attributed to PPP. For example, Fourie and Burger (2000) defined 
two main characteristics of PPP which are true partnership and the transfer of risk to the 
public sector. True partnership encompassed sharing of mutual goal albeit the distinct 
roles of the parties in the partnership. Therefore, they argued that mere outsourcing of 
government service to the private sector does not embody true partnership because in 
doing so, there may not be a mutually agreed goal.  This is also true for cases where 
the private sector only plays the role of funder or financier of the service. The second 
main characteristic of PPP according to them is the assignment of risk to the public 
sector as it will be the impetus of effective commitment of the private sector. Arnold & 
Kehl (2010) listed down six inherent characteristics of PPP. First, PPP should be a 
mutual interdependancy between both public and private sector and the nature of this 
relationship must be cooperative. Second, this relationship should aim for lastingness 
and inclusiveness. Third, significant portion of the shared objective in the partnership 
must be executed by the private sector. Fourth, equal partake of the obligations in the 
partnership between both sectors. Fifth, both sides in the partnership should pursue the 
mutually agreed objectives even though they both have contradictory motive. The sixth 
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characteristic of PPP is that the stipulation for the objective to be achieved in the 
partnership (infrastructure development or service) must be output-oriented or in their 
word “the public authority only determines what the result should be instead of 
regulating how the performance is realised.” (Arnold & Kehl ,2010:8). Continuing on 
the characteristics of PPP, Peters (1998) stated that “what we can do is to develop a set 
of characteristics that appear to be involevd in most partnership arrangements and also 
appear to ber necessary to their formation and maintenance” (p.12). He asserted that 
there are five important characteristics of PPP which are required to enable its formation 
and will decide on its success. First, the partnership in PPP should consist of two or 
more collaborators and public sector must be one of them. Second, each party in the 
partnership must be one with authority to negotiate and make decisions. Third, the 
colaboration in PPP should be continous and lasting. Fourth, each party contributes 
towards the significance of the relationship by adding value to it and lastly, there is a 
mutual obligation and commitment of the parties towards the end result of the 
partnership.  
 Based on the literatures and sources available, PPP encompasses a wide 
spectrum of activities in its “partnership”. Thus, it is not easy to simply pin one 
definitive concept to it as PPP varies across geographical and project perimeter. The 
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essential part of PPP according to available literatures is involvement of public and 
private sector and some sort of partnership arrangement between them, whereas this 
partnership must be meaningful and more than just the transfer of obligation from the 
public sector to the private or simply private sector paying for infrastructure and service 
provision.  
 
2.4 Rationale of PPP in Infrastructure Development 
 Although many literatures dicussed vaious rationale why PPP arrangements are 
used all over the world, this research will only look at two rationales for its 
implementation in infrastructure development (including highway) which are 
overcoming public sector’s budget constraint and achieving greater efficiency.  
The first rationale for implementing PPP as supported by many literatures 
available is to overcome the problem of government’s budget constraint in facing 
growing infrastructure need. ADB (2006, 2007) acknowledged the challenges 
confronting governments in providing adequate funding for the provision and up 
keeping of the infrastructure required to sustain the growing needs of the population. 
The dependency of governments on public funds to satisfy these needs, in addition to 
the limitation and the size of government’s budget often resulted in financial constraint. 
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These conditions create the inclination to bring the private sector’s financial resources 
into infrastructure development. According to ADB, “PPP may be able to mobilize 
previously untapped resources from the local, regional, or international private sector 
which is seeking investment opportunities”(ADB, 2007:3) and “PPPs allow 
governments to overcome their budgetary and borrowing constraints and raise finance 
for high-priority public infrastructure projects. Essentially, governments are able to use 
private finance through PPPs to build infrastructure projects that would previously have 
been built by the public sector using public sector finance” (ADB, 2006: 22). Sarmento 
(2010) stated that the huge investment requirement of infrastructure projects is not 
something that can be afforded by many governments and because of this, PPP assists in 
sufficing this infrastructure funding gap. Similarly, McBrady (2009) mentioned that as 
the funding resource of PPP projects are partly from private capital, the government is 
able to provide and develop infrastructure and services at a lower initial cost. He added 
that “Particularly in the case of costly infrastructure projects, sharing financing burdens 
with private entities can significantly reduce budget constraints” (McBrady, 2009: 3) 
Another study by Shinohara (1998) which focused on the impact of PPP towards 
Japan’s social infrastructure and public service suggested that PPP approach is a way to 
harness private sector’s resources in funding, management and technology for the 
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efficient delivery of public service such as highway development projects. Thus, thus 
prominent notion of Public Private Partnership as an enabler to the government to 
overcome the problem of limited resource has been studied by a growing number of 
researches. 
Higher efficiency in projects and service delivery has also been associated 
by several literatures as the rational of PPP.  Several points of view have been 
associated with the idea of increased efficiency in PPP.  First, the view that the 
participation of private sector player in PPP will bring with it the management and 
technical skills not available in the public sector, or in other word, PPP will be able to 
fully utilize the skills of private sector. One literature which supported this view is 
(Kumaraswamy & Zhang, 2001) who asserted that correctly planned and executed PPP 
will result in higher efficiency compared single handed implementation by either public 
or private sector themselves, as “The private sector, with its wide range of management, 
commercial and technical skills, spurred on by the profit motive and unencumbered by 
layers of bureaucracy, can reputedly perform certain tasks more efficiently than the 
government thereby offering potentially huge benefits to the public” (Zhang and 
Kumaraswamy, 2001:351). The next prominent view is that increased efficiency is 
achievable in PPP due to private sector’s drive to maximize revenue in their 
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participation. The Hong Kong Institute of Surveyors (2009) breaks down the efficiency 
into three prominent advantages associated with PPP. The first being that in PPP, the 
provision of service or infrastructure happens at a faster pace compared to traditional 
public sector procurement as in PPP, the government is not burdened with providing 
large capital to initiate and complete the project, thus speeding up the delivery process. 
Secondly, private sector in the PPP is motivated to finish the project sooner, as their 
responsibilities have been clearly outlined and allotted to them and payment is often 
linked to the evaluation of the service they provided. This arrangement will greatly 
increase the private sector’s drive to complete the project sooner. Third, projects 
implemented with PPP usually have lower whole life cost. This is because in PPP 
projects which comprise of operation and maintenance, the private sector will be 
inclined to reduce the overall life cost of the project in view of maximizing their 
revenue and this is something that could not be attainable in the conventional public 
sector procurement.  
Efficiency of PPP is also associated with the concept of bundling or combining 
the tasks of funding, design, construction, operation and maintenance and assigning 
them to one single entity, the private sector partner (British Columbia Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs, 1999:15), (Grimsey and Lewis, 2007:177). With these tasks bundled, 
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the decision making process can be expedited and lesser bureaucracy will be involved. 
This in turn will lead to faster delivery of services and reduction in cost. In comparison, 
in conventional procurement arrangement, these tasks will have to be designated to 
different parties or unbundled thus leading to increased level of complexity, time and 
cost consumption.  
 
2.5 BOT as one of the many PPP models/arrangements 
 Alfen et al.( 2009) stated that the various PPP arrangements can be classified 
according to their privatization path. They outlined the three privatization paths as 
formal, material and functional privatization. The difference between material and 
functional privatization is mainly that in the former, the transfer of task and ownership 
of the infrastructure is permanent while in the latter it is on a specified, mutually agreed 
time period. Using this classification, they observed that there are numerous contractual 
arrangement of PPP implemented for infrastructure projects around the world (Alfen et 
al., 2009 (18) as shown in this table: 
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Table 2.1 : PPP contract model according to privatization path 
 Source : Adapted after Elfan et al. (2009) 
 
Khanom (2010) discussed the notion that several explanations of The PPP 
concept emphasize on the financial relationships between the parties involved especially 
on the idea that PPP lessen the burden of government finance as it brings the financial 
resources of the private sector. The definitions of PPP methods which emphasize on 
financial relationship are mostly found on literatures focusing on infrastructure 
development and these PPP methods include BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer), BOOT 
(Build-Own-Operate-Transfer) and BOO (Build-Own-Operate), with the most common 
being BOT (Khanom, 2010: 152). With regard to BOT being one of the methods under 
PPP arrangement, Sadka (2007) added that there are some fundamental traits shared by 
PPP (Functional) PPP (Material) 
BOT-Build Operate Transfer (Concession 
Model) 
BOO-Build Operate Own 
BOOT-Build Operate Own Transfer BDBOO-Buy Design Build Operate Own 
DBFO-Design build Finance Operate DBROO-Design Build Rent Operate Own 
DBLOT-Design Build Lease Operate 
Transfer 
 
DBROT- Design Build Rent Operate 
Transfer 
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most PPP projects and there are various form of PPP arrangement available, with the 
most usual are variation of Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) model where the 
private sector or concessionaire in the partnership undertake the responsibilities of 
designing, constructing and financing infrastructure project or BOT model where the 
private sector’s obligations are funding, constructing , operating and transferring to the 
government the infrastructure after the stipulated concession period has ended (Sadka, 
2007:469). Ashuri, Kashani and Lu (2010) supported the view that BOT is one of the 
many arrangements of PPP and it is usually utilized in highway development projects.  
 PPP covers a broad spectrum of arrangements. As such, available literatures 
listed down the various PPP methods including BOT through several approaches. Thillai 
(2004) utilized the ‘degree of privatization’ approach in listing the project structures 
under PPP, starting from lowest degree (lease) to highest degree of privatization 
attainable (BOO). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: PPP methods and the degree of privatization achievable 
Source : Adapted after Thillai (2004) 
 
 
  Degree Of Privatization 
Low          High 
 
   
 
   PPP Project Structure 
Lease ROT BOT BOLT BOOT BOO 
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 Another approach in listing down the wide array of arrangements under PPP is 
by measuring the magnitude of private sector’s risk and involvement. By using this 
approach, combination of privatization degree and degree of risk allocated to the private 
sector for each PPP method can be clearly defined. This approach is used by The 
Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships as exemplified in this figure 
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Figure 2.2 : Category of PPP arrangement according to degree of private sector’s involvement and allocated 
risk 
Source : The Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships 
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2.6 Definition and concept of BOT 
 The concept of BOT as an infrastructure procurement arrangement is said to 
have originated in Turkey in the 1980s and it was the idea of the Prime Minster of 
Turkey at that time to incorporate this alternative funding arrangement into Turkey’s 
infrastructure privatization plan (Tiong, 1990), (McCarthy and Tiong,1991), 
(Kumaraswamy and Zhang, 1999) and (Kumaraswamy and Morris, 2002). As a part of 
PPP’s various arrangement, many definitions of BOT method have emerged. For 
example, Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut (2003) defined BOT as an approach where 
the task of financing, designing, building and operating an infrastructure project 
throughout a mutually agreed operating period is undertaken by the private sector. They 
further added that the operation of the infrastructure project along the specified time 
also includes the right for the private sector to charge users of the project as a revenue 
source and generate profit for their investment. After the granted operation period has 
ended, the ownership of the infrastructure must be transferred to the government. 
Xenidis and Angelides (2005) defined BOT through several of its major characteristics 
which are a concession period where the private sector (or concessionaire) is allowed to 
operate an infrastructure project with the norm of being 30 to 40 years following the 
completion of the project, the project itself being financed, designed and constructed by 
the private sector, the concession period grants the private sector the right to collect 
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revenue from users of the project and the transfer of the project back without incurring 
any cost to the government after the concession period has ended. Several other 
literatures supported the idea that BOT as one of the arrangements under PPP should 
have these main concepts, namely the government appoints and awards a private sector 
partner (concessionaire), the private sector or concession company being responsible for 
the financing, design, construction, operation and maintenance of the infrastructure 
along the concession period, a concession period for the private sector to undertake all 
the responsibilities and utilize the infrastructure to generate revenue to cover their 
investment and the handing back of the infrastructure to the government after the 
concession period ended (Nassar, 1996) (Shalakany, 1996) (Esq, 1996) and 
(Tiong,1995). Parikh and Samson (1999) give further clarification to BOT through the 
way it “Provides private consortia with a concession to finance, build, operate, and 
maintain a facility/road. During the life of the concession, investors collect user fees to 
cover the costs of construction, debt servicing, and operations. At the end of the 
concession period, the facility reverts to the public authority in question” (p.5). 
 
2.7 General literatures on BOT 
 Levy (1996) discussed about BOT and public procurement. As the popularity 
of BOT method of financing increases, it has become the preferred choice for many 
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countries around the world especially in the development of large scale infrastructure 
project such as highways. He added that this increased popularity is also driven by the 
compatibility of BOT with projects of such scale, which are characterized by huge 
investment and long gestation period. From his observation, Levy suggested that in 
order to incorporate BOT method into good government procurement practice, a 
comprehensive, working framework which can easily attuned both processes needs to 
be created. Available regulation by international bodies such as UNCITRAL, UNIDO 
and World Bank have been used as guiding principles towards achieving good 
governance in public procurement procedures. Therefore, the same set of regulation can 
be applied to a country’s BOT scheme in order to create a sound framework for 
incorporating BOT into public procurement. He asserted that “a sound public 
procurement law promotes good government ideals by encouraging confidence that 
government will act responsibly in its purchases, by seeking optimum value for public 
funds in an atmosphere of accountability, and allowing fair competition through 
regulated, transparent practices” (Levy, 1996:97). The significance of public 
procurement is that it among others enhances infrastructure facilities and this in turn 
will promote business activities and contribute towards society’s well being. Therefore, 
the important things for a sound government procurement framework are getting the 
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product and services at the most reasonable cost and at the same time promote 
confidence in government by ensuring that corruption can be restrained. As more and 
more government is turning to BOT as preferred procurement method, the need for 
incorporating good governance practices in its implementation becomes more eminent. 
Levy suggested adapting available international guidelines which promote competitive 
procurement procedures such as tendering. For BOT scheme to be successfully used as 
a public procurement method, it must incorporate tendering as tendering is described as 
“the method of procurement widely recognized as generally the most effective in 
promoting competition, economy and efficiency” (UNCITRAL). He further concurred 
that the correct direction for attaining good governance in BOT is through attaining the 
objectives of transparency and competition. Measures that must be taken to achieve the 
desired level of transparency should include the public disclosure of bid solicitation, bid 
selection and award of the contract. The importance of good governance framework for 
PPP arrangement such as BOT is due to the fact that it allows the public sector to obtain 
economic assets (infrastructure) without depleting public fund while simultaneously 
retaining control of the project. Additionally, for BOT project to be successful the public 
sector’s prolonged scrutiny and control is detrimental while the private sector 
concurrently must be able to outline the long term viability of the project. With regard to 
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this, the current form of BOT being practiced could still be improved to increase 
transparency and competition. Levy concludes that a sound regulatory model which 
complies with good governance characteristics and clearly acknowledging tender as the 
best procurement method should be adapted for BOT projects.  
 The increasing popularity of BOT as the procurement method of choice for 
infrastructure projects is among others, driven by government’s tendency to seek 
funding source from the private sector. Based on the successful implementation BOT 
projects in both developed and developing countries, McCarthy and Tiong (1991) 
elucidated in detail about the financial and contractual aspect of BOT projects, 
especially in infrastructure development. In BOT projects, the corporate structure is 
different from conventional infrastructure procurement. The number parties involved in 
BOT projects are bigger. Generally, they are the client (government or public sector), 
the constructor, the operator, off takers, suppliers, lenders and investors. With these 
parties as participants, the procurement procedure begins with the awarding of the 
project to the concession company who in turn will undertake the ‘bundled’ tasks of 
designing, constructing, financing, managing, operating and maintaining the 
infrastructure asset along the agreed concession period before transferring it to the 
government. In comparison, in conventional procurement of infrastructure asset, the 
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task undertaken by the contractor is usually limited to construction and commissioning 
(with the exception of design and build project). In this study, they also listed down 
several characteristics of the financial aspect of BOT projects. The first and most 
significant is that the financial instrument utilized for funding the project may differ 
according to the economic condition of the BOT implementing country. For developed 
country such as UK, financing of BOT project can be from investor in the domestic 
market whereas in developing countries, financing usually comes from debt instrument. 
To increase the success rate of BOT project undertaken, the host government should 
provide several assistance and incentives in the form as follows: 
 Foreign-exchange guarantee – Host government should ensure that for project 
financed from oversea sources, remittance guarantee will be provided and 
project sponsors are secured of their ability to freely remit the revenues 
generated from the project 
 Offshore escrow – Host government should assist the project sponsor in the 
matter of creating an offshore escrow account for all project revenue and foreign 
loans 
 Off take agreement – To increase lenders’ confidence that the concessionaire can 
generate the required amount of revenue to offset their loans, the host 
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government could assist by having a minimum guarantee of demand volume or 
operating income 
 Supply agreement – In order to ensure the uninterrupted supply of raw materials 
needed for the BOT project, the host government could arrange for a guaranteed 
supply of such materials at competitive prices 
 Allowing concession to operate existing facility – Host government can allow 
the concession company to operate another existing facility and charge users of 
that facility 
 Retention of title – Host government is guaranteed ownership of the physical 
assets in case of project failure. Therefore, for lenders’ benefit, in view of this 
provision, host government or project sponsors should provide other form of 
guarantee.  
Regarding the contractual aspects of BOT projects, McCarthy and Tiong 
enumerated these prominent aspects: 
 Concessions – It is important for BOT projects to have a regulatory, controlling 
guideline. Although it is sufficient for BOT concession to be regulated by 
contract or statute, there are some requirements in it which require intervention 
and enabling provision beyond what can be guaranteed by contract, such as 
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matters pertaining to private land acquisition or processing of planning 
application. Therefore, for forming concessions in BOT projects, it is better to 
have enabling legislation already in place either in the form of special law or act 
specific to BOT projects’ needs as its regulatory framework. 
 Operation and Maintenance – Operation and Maintenance in BOT projects can 
either be undertaken by the concessionaire company itself or contracted out. 
 Construction – Procurement of construction service in BOT projects is 
commonly executed using turnkey fixed price contract. In this arrangement 
constructor’s proposition is in the form of lump sum price in which all risks 
associated are borne by him. Another salient aspect in procurement of BOT 
project is time bonus and penalties associated to project and concessionaire’s 
performance. In brief, concessionaire will be rewarded for early completion and 
punished for delay.  
 Independent checker and project management company – Due to the large scale 
of BOT project and its complexity, sometimes independent checker or project 
management service provider is appointed to guarantee proper execution of the 
related works 
For BOT project to be successful, support from the government side is 
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detrimental especially in the form of economic incentives and regulatory framework. All 
parties involved should understand the challenges they may face in its implementation. 
McCarthy and Tiong reaffirmed that “the BOT model is a challenging and increasingly 
popular method of procuring infrastructure assets…as governments, financiers and 
contractors become more aware of the concept, its use can only spread” (p.227). 
A central topic to BOT scheme or agreement in infrastructure development is 
about the risk involved. Literatures available acknowledged that BOT infrastructure 
development is a complex large scale endeavour which is both resource intensive and 
requires intrinsic planning and management. BOT scheme, as well as other PPP 
arrangement, usually contains multiple dimensions, from economic to political. It is 
because of this complex arrangement that a sound framework with sufficient 
government intervention is required to ensure the success of it. Regarding government’s 
duties in BOT infrastructure development, Kumaraswamy and Zhang (2001) chronicled 
the ways government must act to support the private partner and guaranteeing success. 
Their study was based on the example of successful BOT projects in Hong Kong (Cross 
Harbour Tunnel and four other subsequent tunnel projects) and failed BOT projects in 
Thailand (Bangkok Elevated Transport System) and Lao PDR (Tha Ngone Bridge 
Project). The main finding of their study is that the success or failure of BOT 
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infrastructure development is heavily dependent on the creation of suitable, conducive 
environment in all the applicable dimensions of the development itself. These 
dimensions are political, legal and economic and the host government in BOT must be 
able to nurture and strengthen that environment. As BOT projects are fraught with 
complexity, its implementation is accompanied by distinctive risks and uncertainties. 
Therefore, the successful implementation of BOT project cannot be guaranteed unless 
the required assistance is provided by the government, especially in setting up sufficient 
regulatory framework, establishing correct political and financial condition and 
arranging minimal guarantee needed to support a balanced risk-return structure 
(Kumaraswamy and Zhang, 2001). However, they also stated that if the entire 
prerequisites listed have been provided by the government, it is still not an assurance of 
the guaranteed success of BOT project as the government’s involvement throughout the 
whole process of the project is imperative. 
In relation to the conducive environment that needs to be created for BOT 
projects to succeed, Kumaraswamy and Zhang listed down the actions required from the 
host government. First, the host government must uphold a win-win principle especially 
pertaining to foreign investment, with the aim to attract foreign fund into the project and 
ensure efficiency in it to a level that is acceptable to the public. The government must 
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also establish sufficient legislative and regulatory structure. Next, a stable and 
consistent political environment with a central authority acting as a regulator and 
controller of BOT project is needed. The host government moreover must be credible 
and capable of ensuring that the agreed stipulation of the BOT project undertaken is 
able to withstand the risk of government and administration change. They further 
asserted that having a developed domestic capital market will contribute positively 
towards the financial aspect of BOT project. The host government should encourage 
competitive bidding and tendering arrangement and propagate transparency in all stages 
of the project. Assisting in land acquisition matters and providing guarantees to assist in 
redressing financial risks are the two last steps suggested for the government to 
undertake. Although they propose the host government to take measures to foster this 
encouraging environment required to attract private sector participation, government 
must also ensures that the right balance is attained between providing assistance (in the 
form of guarantees etc) and imposing control and regulation on the project. Too much 
guarantee will lead to oversimplifying the risk sharing of the private sector partner, 
discourage competition and negate the efficiency benefit aspired. The right amount of 
involvement by the government is imperative and it should be in a proactive, dynamic 
role starting from the initiation till the completion of the project. Concluding their study 
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on governmental role in BOT infrastructure project, Kumaraswamy and Zhang further 
outlined three important processes that must needs to be emphasized by the government 
in the whole implementation process to ensure project quality and success. The three 
processes are “execution of feasibility study, selection of the most suitable BOT 
concessionaire and continuous assessment of project success” (Kumarasawamy and 
Zhang, 2001). 
In another study, Tiong (1990) focused on the aspect of risks and securities of 
BOT infrastructure projects. He asserted that normally in BOT project, the government 
is aiming for the project to be financed by the private sector solely through the expected 
revenue and this revenue will act as security for the project, as opposed to offering 
straightforward absolute guarantee of the project debt. Like Kumaraswamy and Zhang 
(2001) and McCarthy and Tiong (1991), he emphasized that BOT infrastructure project 
contains various risks that needs to be carefully maneuvered. Active government 
participation is needed to lessen the effect of the risks and ensuring project success. He 
also suggested that in BOT infrastructure project, the amount if risk undertaken by the 
private partner is larger than the public sector counterpart. For example, the private 
sector has to arrange for financing and operation of the project after construction 
completes. Due to this, commercial and financial considerations are more likely to be 
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the determining factor for a successful BOT project proposal compared to technical 
elements. Focus should be given to the risks and securities of BOT schemes especially 
throughout construction and operation phases and what solution to apply for successful 
project implementation. Better comprehension of the BOT project stages and the roles 
assigned to the private sector partner at each stage will assist in understanding the risks 
involved and the securities against them. Tiong (1990) described BOT infrastructure 
project in similar vein to a major start-up business. This view is quite befitting in regard 
to BOT project normally creates new infrastructures, similar to start-up business starting 
something new. Therefore, undertaking the BOT project requires the project sponsor to 
find financial resources, construct the infrastructure, operate and maintain it and transfer 
it to the government at the end of the concession period. During this period from 
initiation to transfer, the main source of security for the project sponsor to offset the 
debts they took is from revenue generated by the project. He further divided the BOT 
project period into five phases which are pre-investment, implementation, construction, 
operation and transfer (Tiong 1991: ) In each phase, he held that there are risks involved 
and the project sponsor have specific obligations accordingly. He also suggested that the 
risk factor in BOT project can also be spread out into two phases, in which each phase 
can be treated as a well defined project itself. The first phase is the construction phase 
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or the relatively high risk construction project. The second phase is the operation phase 
which corresponds to the relatively low risk utility project. The movement of risk along 
the two project phase is from construction to operation, where during construction risk 
factors rise acutely and reach the top during early operational years. This characteristic 
is because in construction phase, large fund is up front to accommodate the buying of 
materials, labour and equipments. Upon completion and operation, the project will start 
generating revenue and project sponsor can start repaying their debts and making profits. 
Thus, at this phase the risk gradually decrease along the period up to the transfer to the 
government. Concurring with Kumaraswamy and Zhang (2001) and McCarthy and 
Tiong (1991), Tiong (1992) explained that the risks involved in BOT infrastructure 
projects can be classified into three major categories, financial, political and technical. 
For each category, security in the form of either government incentives or private 
sector’s contingency action is beneficial in mitigating and softening the effects of those 
risks. For financial risk, he outlined four form of assistance from the government which 
greatly help the project implementation, namely provision if foreign exchange guarantee, 
assistance in establishing offshore escrow account and creating off take and feedstock 
agreement. The basic idea of having these incentives offered by the government is that it 
will aid in attracting finance source to the project as it increases lenders’ confidence to 
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invest in it. Political risk on the other hand encompasses a broad spectrum of risk and it 
is the most difficult risk element to manage. To face political risk, he suggested having a 
concession agreement for a clearly stipulated time period, entering into BOT project in 
the form of consortium, taking political risk insurance form international agencies such 
as OPIC and EGCD and having the host government to agree for financial undertaking 
in the occurrence of force majeure will serve as security guaranteeing continuation and 
success of the project. The last group of risk is technical risk which can be controlled by 
the project sponsor themselves. Among the technical risks and their mitigation steps are 
construction and completion delay which he suggested can be overcame with enforcing 
a lump sum turnkey contract for construction with experienced turnkey constructor 
utilizing proven technology and strictly following the stipulated time frame. For 
operation and maintenance risk, provision of sufficient warranty period and 
maintenance bonds will enable the contractor to improve any shortcoming in the 
construction. From his observation, Tiong reaffirmed that for BOT project to be 
successful, the project finance must be structured with “as little recourse as possible to 
the sponsors or government” and concurrently, acceptable guarantees and undertakings 
must be provided to ensure that “lenders will be satisfied with the credit risk” (pp.327).  
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2.8 Literatures on BOT implementation in Malaysia 
 Although there are a lot of literatures available pertaining to privatization and 
PPP implementation in Malaysia, very few of them focused on the use of BOT 
procurement arrangement for highway projects. With scarce literature focusing on the 
implementation of BOT scheme in highway development in Malaysia, the other 
literatures available serve as clarifying background on the aspect of privatization and 
BOT arrangement for infrastructure project in general. Hensley and White (1993) 
observed upon how Malaysia has succeeded in integrating BOT and 
Build-Operate-Own (BOO) schemes into her National Privatization Strategy. They 
observed that Malaysia’s program is a national program that is “most ambitious” 
considering the fact that Malaysia is a developing country. Implementation of this 
nationwide, large scale privatization initiative is assisted by the establishment of 
privatization strategies aimed at reaching the highest level of efficiency and taking full 
advantage of the available financing source, management know how and new 
technology and using them as tools for nurturing economic growth. Malaysia’s 
remarkable privatization drive is characterized by various unique traits and one of the 
most prominent traits is the successful increase in the number of ambitious 
infrastructures and services achieved by using BOT and BOO arrangements. This is in 
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line with Malaysia’s aspiration to attain industrial country status within a decade from 
the start of the privatization program (1985). The focus of privatization in Malaysia is 
on “internationally competitive infrastructure” such as telecommunication, power and 
highways. Malaysia’s rationales of launching a national privatization drive are in line 
with the rationales explained in other literatures. Among them are the growing demand 
for infrastructure and public service investment beyond the amount affordable by 
government’s budget. Faced with the funding gap to implement infrastructure project, 
Malaysia went into full privatization program through the establishment of sequence of 
measures, among them issuing a “privatization guideline” clarifying Malaysia’s 
privatization’s rationales and objectives. The outlined objectives of Malaysia’s 
privatization are to lessen the government’s financial and administration burden, 
encourage competition and enhance efficiency, energize private entrepreneurship and 
investment with the aim of expediting economic growth, to aid in reducing the size of 
public sector, cutting down monopoly and bureaucracy and the special objective of 
contributing towards the goals of Malaysia’s New Economic Policy. To lead the 
Malaysian privatization program, the government of Malaysia established a 
Privatization Committee responsible for all matters pertaining to privatization. Hensley 
and White (1993) also observed that the Malaysian privatization guideline contains the 
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selection procedure for prospective private sector partner. Although the fundamental 
idea where the government select the suitable private partner or concessionaire is 
encompassed in this guideline, the guideline also incorporate a peculiarity in the form 
that the private sector, local or foreign, is able to initiate the process of privatization by 
submitting proposal of privatization project to the government. This eccentricity is to 
the extent that the private sector is encouraged to suggest privatization project through 
submission of detailed proposal to the government and certain level of exclusivity will 
be given to the first party submitting detailed proposal. The guideline also allow for the 
private sector to propose privatization of either existing infrastructure or create new 
infrastructure project. Hensley and White described this promotion for private sector to 
kick start privatization projects as “the most innovative and exciting privatization 
development in Malaysia” (p.79). Malaysia’s approach to BOT scheme for highway 
development is reflected by its first BOT highway project, the North South Highway. In 
this project, Malaysia’s eagerness to promote BOT method is shown by its supportive 
financial assistance to the concessionaire in the form of support loan, traffic volume 
supplement and external risk supplement. This enthusiastic approach to BOT is a likely 
catalyst for expediting the privatization process. They concluded that Malaysia’s 
privatization experience is best characterized by “the successful use of BOO and BOT 
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techniques to mobilize private sector resources in the risks, responsibilities, and reward 
of the country’s crucial infrastructure base” (Hensley and White, 1993: 82) 
 The Malaysian experience in privatization also serves as the focal point of a 
study by Yaacob and Naidu (1997). From this study, several aspects regarding 
infrastructure privatization are clarified and these aspects are also applicable to BOT 
arrangement in Malaysia. They stated that privatization program in Malaysia was started 
in the mid 1980s in a national program of economic transformation aiming at changing 
the nation to an industrial country. With the program in place, Malaysia started to shift 
its infrastructure projects from being undertaken solely by the government towards 
increasing participation of the private sector. According to them, this participation was 
through various methods of privatization including BOT. Besides the objective of 
aiming to be an industrial nation, the push for privatization was also driven by 
increasing public sector deficit caused by huge government involvement in the economy 
which resulted in the government being unable to sufficiently provide for infrastructure 
development needs. By embracing this privatization initiative, Malaysia have gone 
through a reformation of the conditions of infrastructure provision from government’s 
domain to heavy private sector involvement across wide array of infrastructure 
including highways. Private sector’s entrance into infrastructure development in 
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Malaysia is safeguarded by the contractual arrangement with the government. The 
contracting for private sector’s provision of infrastructure in Malaysia takes many forms 
such as leasing and concession, with concession being the most used. This is reflected 
by the use of concession contract through BOT method for the development of sixteen 
highway projects form the year 1985 to 1997 (Yaacob and Naidu: 45). On the certain 
peculiarity of Malaysia’s privatization method, as also observed by Hensley and White 
(1993), Malaysia encouraged the public sector to propose projects for privatization 
through submission of unsolicited proposal. The unsolicited proposal will be studied by 
the Privatization Unit for its feasibility and viability and if it is found to be a good 
proposal, the proposer will be given a letter of intent and the permission to proceed to 
the next stage of contracting and the first party submitting such proposal is given the 
exclusivity in undertaking the project. Yaacob and Naidu (1997) also observed that in 
both case of solicited and unsolicited bidding, the final selection of the awarded 
concessionaire is usually on the discretion of Malaysia’s top political leader and the 
selection criteria is not disclosed. They asserted that Malaysia’s preference of single 
source negotiated contracting is due to three assumptions. The first one being that it 
allows for lower transaction cost compared to competitive bidding. Next, competitive 
bidding may complicate and obstruct the achievement of Malaysia’s New Economic 
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Policy goals and lastly, competitive bidding may take longer time to be completed. They 
further reaffirmed that despite the eccentricity in its procedure, Malaysia’s privatization 
program can be considered a success based on the number of projects implemented and 
amount of private fund invested. This success can be accredited to three main factors 
namely the government’s meaningful and abundant commitment towards the 
privatization of infrastructure, government’s true intention to ensure projects success 
and the genuine, direct institutional structure for infrastructure privatization assisting in 
the contract facilitation. 
 
2.9 Assessment of past Literature 
 PPP has been viewed as the solution for countries facing funding gap for their 
infrastructure development needs. More and more countries are turning to PPP as the 
alternative procurement arrangement and this creates a shift of responsibilities and risk 
from the public to the private sectors. As the preference for PPP rises, so does the 
emergence of literatures on this topic. Based on the literatures reviewed, it has been 
made clear that it is not easy to give a definition of PPP that will suit all of its variation 
of implementations. However, by looking at the characteristics of PPP, some form of 
similarities can be derived. The motive or rationale for countries to shift to PPP for 
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provision of infrastructure and services is also being enlightened by scholars and among 
them are the views that PPP enable government to utilize private fund and PPP increases 
efficiency. Furthermore, scholars also threw light on the various arrangements available 
under PPP which clearly showed that BOT is one of them. Scholars also clarified the 
concept of BOT and how does it fit into infrastructure development. 
 Being the most used PPP arrangement for infrastructure developments, many 
scholars have studied about BOT model and aspects of its implementation. Various 
studies delved into the conceptual framework of BOT and its integration into public 
procurement program. Some other studies, among them McCarthy and Tiong (1991) 
focused on the financial and contractual aspects of BOT and elucidated that these 
aspects in BOT scheme are different than conventional procurement for infrastructure. 
Other scholars studied the risk aspects of BOT especially on how the risks are spread 
out between the parties involved. Kumaraswamy and Zhang (2001) and Tiong (1990) 
showed that in view of the risks faced by implementer of BOT, several steps can be 
taken to mitigate the risks. The three literatures also suggested the framework that must 
be established for successful implementation of BOT. 
 The BOT model implemented in Malaysia’s highway development attracted 
several scholars to study about it. Hensley and White (1993) went into great details 
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about how Malaysia successfully incorporated BOT into one of its national policy to the 
extent that peculiarities can be observed on BOT implementation in Malaysia. 
Privatization of infrastructure in Malaysia including the use of BOT became the focus 
of Yaacob and Naidu (1997) and they attempted to shed some light on the policies that 
drove the decision making in Malaysia. From both literatures about BOT in Malaysia, 
some aspects of its implementation are clarified. Assessing the available literatures on 
BOT and BOT implementation in Malaysia, it can be deduced that these scholars: Levy 
(1996), McCarthy and Tiong (1991), Kumaraswamy and Zhang (2001), Tiong (1990), 
Hensley and White (1993) and Yaacob and Naidu (1997) although focused on the 
conceptual framework, risk factors and certain aspects of BOT and its implementation 
in Malaysia, all of them only touched the surface of the crux question of how Malaysia 
have managed to use BOT arrangement for all of her highway development projects. No 
scholar has explained in detail about BOT implementation in Malaysia including the 
policy behind it, the administration of it, how does a BOT scheme initiated, selected and 
awarded, the parties involved in its implementation, what measures does the Malaysian 
government took to ensure its success and all of its characteristics along the whole 
project process. Therefore, this research will try to show clearly how is BOT scheme 
implemented in Malaysia for highway developments with clear explanation of the 
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processes involved and by doing so, it is hoped that this research will be able to 
contribute to the growing literatures on BOT highways in Malaysia. 
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CHAPTER 3: BOT HIGHWAY DEVELOPMENT IN MALAYSIA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter of the research will examine the geographic, socio-economic and 
historical background of Malaysia’s development in general and specifically on its road 
network development. By clarifying this background, it will be easier to comprehend 
the reason why Malaysia embarked on privatization of its highway development 
specifically through implementation of BOT method. Another importance of this 
chapter is that it explains the process of implementing BOT highway development in 
Malaysia with details on the parties, regulations and procedures involved through the 
review of selected case studies. 
 
3.2 Malaysia’s Background 
Malaysia is a country in South East Asia. It is a nation consisting of two main 
regions, the West (peninsular) Malaysia and East Malaysia, which are separated by the 
South China Sea and with the total land area of 328,657 square kilometers. The terrain 
characteristic of Malaysia is coastal plains in the west and east coast of Peninsular 
Malaysia with mountainous forests in the center and the same characteristic is also 
shared by East Malaysia. The Peninsular Malaysia is located at the most South Eastern 
end of the Asian continent, bordering Thailand to the north and Singapore to the south 
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while the latter is located in the Island of Borneo bordering Indonesia and Brunei. Naidu 
(2007) stated that “bbecause there is no contiguity between Peninsular Malaysia and the 
two states of Sabah and Sarawak, from the perspective of infrastructure planning 
Malaysia does not constitute a single entity” (p.207). As such, infrastructure planning 
and development in Malaysia is not very simple as separate consideration has to be 
made for both regions. The geographical location of west Malaysia enables land 
transportation from Thailand to Singapore with the distance between the Southern 
Thailand/ North Malaysia border to the Malaysia/Singapore border at approximately 
800 kilometers. The capital of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur and the administrative center, 
Putrajaya are both located in the West Coast of Peninsular Malaysia. The main 
international airport (the Kuala Lumpur International Airport), four of Malaysia’s main 
ports and six other places which have been granted city status (apart from the Capital 
Kuala Lumpur) are also located in the West Coast of Peninsular Malaysia. The East 
Coast region of Peninsular Malaysia and the East Malaysia region are not as developed 
as the West Coast of Peninsular Malaysia and the government of Malaysia is taking 
necessary measures to rectify this imbalance in development (KKLW, 2009).  
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The World Bank categorized Malaysia as a developing country with upper 
middle income level
9
. The GDP in current US$ and the total population count for the 
year 2010 is $237.8 billion and 28,401,017 respectively. The annual real GDP growth 
rates for Malaysia for the past five years are 5.9% (2006); 6.3% (2007); 4.6% (2008); 
-1.7% (2009); 7.2% (2010) and estimated by the Malaysian government to be 5% to 6% 
for the year 2011
10
. In term of available road, Malaysia has the total of 98,721 
kilometers of roads, with 80,280 kilometers of it properly paved, including 1,821 
kilometers of highways
11
.  
Historically, Malaysia has been under the control of several European forces 
like the Portuguese, the Dutch and the British and for three years during the Second 
World War, the Japanese. Between 1815 and 1941, there was a huge increase in world 
trade which was driven by the Industrial Revolution in the Western Countries. As a 
result, there was increasing demand for raw materials needed for the production of 
goods and Malaya (Malaysia’s name prior 1963) was set to answer that demand with the 
favorable conditions it has such as large area of usable land for the farming of the corps 
demanded and its strategic location near trade routes (Drabble, n.d.). To capitalize on 
                                                     
9 From The World Bank’s website http://data.worldbank.org/country/malaysia 
10 From the website of U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2777.htm 
11 From CIA The World Factbook 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/my.html 
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this situation, the British Colonial government built infrastructures such as road 
networks to support the increasing economic activities in Malaya. However, the 
emphasis on infrastructure development was only in areas involved in economic 
activities supported by the British government such as tin mining and rubber plantations 
(KKLW, 2009). The consequence of this act of the British government was that the 
infrastructure development in Malaysia was uneven and imbalance as most of it was 
only focused on certain regions (Naidu, 2007: p.208).  
 
3.3 Road Network in Malaysia before Highway Development 
 The first highway developed in Malaysia using BOT method was the 8 
kilometer long, two way four lanes ‘North Klang Straits Bypass’ in 1984 (Ministry of 
Works, 2009: p.15). Before the development of this highway, Malaysia already had a 
good network of roads especially in the Peninsular Malaysia. This is due to the road 
development undertaken by the British Colonial government while Malaysia was still 
under its rule. Prior to Malaysia’s independence in 1957, the British government had 
developed road networks to establish political command and to enable access to the 
main towns (Leinbach, 1975). The decision of the British government to develop road 
networks in Malaya during the time of its administration, according to Leinbach, was 
driven by the realization that adequate and functioning communication system was 
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important for ensuring that prosperity can be maintained. Historical records showed that 
road networks progressed during the time of British administration with system of cart 
road in Malacca by 1867, road network connecting economic and settlement areas after 
1897 and established trunk road network connecting Penang and Malacca by 1911 
(Leinbach, 1975). By 1942, it was reported that Peninsular Malaysia had already well 
built, hard surfaced roads connecting most part of the region and this road connectivity 
played a major role during Japanese invasion of Peninsular Malaysia during the Second 
World War as “Japanese soldiers rode them down, as much as twenty hours a 
stretch”(Parfitt, 2006:para 20). The period of being a British colony has benefited 
Malaysia in term of road provision as the British administration has developed sufficient 
transportation infrastructure in its effort to consolidate the states in Peninsular Malaysia 
into a united political structure. In doing so, states were connected through trunk road 
networks and secondary development roads linking state capitals and other districts, 
especially in the major towns like Penang, Ipoh and Kuala Lumpur and areas 
surrounding them (Leinbach, 1975). By the time of its independence in 1957, Malaysia 
has been left behind “a reasonably well-developed set of infrastructure facilities” (Naidu, 
2007: p204). In term of transportation network, the British administration has provided 
an excellent network made of railways and paved roads especially in Peninsular 
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Malaysia, while in East Malaysia, the road network was still at its early stages and 
remained second after river transportation (UNDP, 2005).. 
 After its independence, Malaysia continues to expand and upgrade the road 
networks it inherited from the British administration. Planning and budget allocation for 
infrastructure development is incorporated into the five year economic plan (the 
Malaysian Plan) which are reviewed at each halfway of its implementation. At yearly 
level, the development plan and budget allocation are further scrutinized to ensure the 
optimum implementation. Utilizing these planning and budgeting mechanisms, 
Malaysia broadens and improves its infrastructure provisions while simultaneously 
addresses the imbalance of infrastructure development between its regions. Based on 
the previous Malaysia Plans, the government’s emphasis on infrastructure development 
can be clearly illustrated by the amount spent which on it. Infrastructure expenditure 
shows a significant increase between 1966 and 2005 with the amount spent in 2001 to 
2005 (RM 64.12 Billion) increased by forty-six times the amount spent in 1966 to 1970 
(RM 1.38 Billion) (Naidu, 2007). The expenditure for road development in Malaysia 
also increases in each five year Malaysia Plan from 1966 to 2005 as shown in figure 
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Figure 3.1: Malaysian Road Development Expenditure 1966 - 2005 
Source : Economic Planning Unit of Malaysia 
The effect of this emphasis on road development can be clearly illustrated by 
the increasing total road length in Malaysia during the same period of time, the total 
road length in 2005 (87,000 kilometers) grew almost six times the length in 1996 
(15,000 kilometers).  
Type of Road Length in 1966 (km) Length in 2006 (km) 
Paved 12,464 67,851 
Gravel 2,107 15,989 
Earth 785 3,185 
Total 15,256 87,025 
Table 3. 1: Malaysia's Road Development Growth (1966-2005)     
Source : Adapted from Naidu (2007) 
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In Malaysia, the road networks consisted of several classifications or types of 
road according to its location, builder and caretaker. The roads built and maintained by 
the federal government using federal fund are categorized as federal roads. At state level, 
state governments also undertook the task of building and maintaining some roads and 
at road provision also happens at local government or municipal level. The federal road 
network itself is made of several type of roads that has been gazetted with the main 
being the interstate and intrastate federal routes connecting all the states in Peninsular 
Malaysia and Sabah and Sarawak in East Malaysia. These main federal routes have 
been the backbone of Malaysia’s transportation system and contributed to the economic 
activities and development. For example, the Federal Route number 1 is the main road 
connecting the northernmost part of peninsular Malaysia up to the border of Thailand to 
the southernmost part bordering Singapore. With the length of 826 kilometres, federal 
route number 1 enables movement of people and goods from Southern Thailand to 
Singapore while passing through all the states in the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia 
including the capital Kuala Lumpur. The 277 kilometre long Federal Route number 2 on 
the other hand linked the Malaysian capital Kuala Lumpur to the East Coast Port of 
Kuantan in Pahang thus effectively connecting the West Coast of Peninsular Malaysia 
to the East Coast. Further connectivity among the states in Peninsular Malaysia is 
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achieved by the Federal Route number 3 which links the east coast states of Kelantan, 
Terengganu and Pahang with the Southernmost state in Peninsular Malaysia, Johor 
through a 739 kilometre road. Besides this route, the main federal road networks also 
connect other parts of Malaysia and combined with the state and municipal road, it 
creates an intricate, comprehensive road network in Malaysia as shown in figure 3.2 
below: 
 
 
Figure 3.2 : Major Federal routes in Peninsular Malaysia 
Source : Public Works Department of Malaysia 
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The main federal routes are interconnected and complemented by the other 
road networks. However, with growing economic and traffic volume, the need for a 
more competitive road networks system became more eminent. The interconnectivity of 
the existing road networks, even though created a complete road system, also 
contributed to the reduced efficiency of it. Factors such as high numbers of traffic lights 
and periphery junctions along the existing road networks caused prolonged travel time, 
traffic congestion and reduced its ability to effectively accommodate the increasing 
traffic volume.  
 
3.4 Development of Highway before the Privatization 
 The definition of highway or expressway in Malaysia is “high speed routes 
with four lanes minimum, made up of two lanes in each direction with either limited or 
partial accessibility” (Bhattacharya, n.d.: p.2). Sahai (2003) stated that the toll road 
made its debut in the Asian region in Malaysia back in 1966. According to Hunt, Hamid 
and Mohamed (1989) the first toll road highway in Malaysia was the public funded, 
administered by the Malaysian Public Works department (PWD) 20 kilometer long 
Tanjung Malim-Slim River highway which started its toll collection in 1966. At the end 
of 1977, the Malaysian government decided to develop a tolled expressway form the 
north to the south of Peninsular Malaysia to better link the major towns and developing 
67 
 
areas in the West Coast of the Peninsular. The tolled North-South Expressway (NSE) 
will start at Bukit Kayu Hitam, a small town at the Thailand-Malaysia border and end at 
Johor Bahru, the state capital of Johor, the southernmost town in the Peninsular 
bordering Singapore (Malaysian Highway Authority, 2009). The proposed 823 
kilometer highway was developed with the main objective of creating a complete and 
efficient inter town road system capable of accommodating the increasing number of 
vehicles. The increase in vehicle number and traffic volume in Malaysia was quite 
significant that it warranted an alternative to the Federal Route number 1 to be 
constructed. Between 1970 and 2007, the increase in number of vehicles registered for 
use in Malaysia is as shown in figure 3.3 below: 
 
 Figure 3.3 : Number of Registered Vehicles in Malaysia (1970-2007) 
 Source ; Department of Statistics Malaysia 
 Along with the development of the first highway in Malaysia, the Malaysian 
Highway Authority (MHA) was established in 1980 through the tabling of The Highway 
0 
5000000 
10000000 
15000000 
20000000 
1970 1975 1987 1997 2007 
744300 1385000 
3674500 
8550469 
16770000 
Number of Registered Vehicles 
68 
 
Authority Malaysia (Incorporation) Act 1980 or Act 231. This act empowered the MHA 
“to supervise and execute the design, construction, regulation, operation and 
maintenance of inter-urban highways, to impose and collect tolls, to enter into contracts 
and to provide for matters connected therewith” (The Highway Authority Malaysia 
(Incorporation) Act 1980). The MHA was established as one of the agency under the 
power of the Ministry of Works Malaysia and its authority and role in the BOT highway 
implementation in Malaysia will be further discussed in this chapter. The physical 
development of the North South Expressway started in 1977 under the supervision of 
the PWD and from 1980 transferred to the MHA in accordance to its authority and 
function. At that point, the NSE was a public sector project funded solely by the 
government of Malaysia. The development of the NSE was done in phases and between 
1980 and 1986, the MHA succeeded in constructing several phases of the project 
totaling 366 kilometer or 41% out of the proposed 823 kilometer highway. In term of 
cost, the amount of work completed as a public infrastructure project by the MHA was 
at RM 3.2 Billion. The works undertaken by the MHA in that period of time include the 
construction of new stretches of highway for example the Bukit Kayu Hitam-Jitra-Alor 
Setar stretch and taking over the operation of existing toll highway like the Tanjung 
Malim-Slim River highway (Santhiman, 2011). 
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3.5 Malaysia’s Privatization Policy: The Beginning of Privatized Highways 
 In 1983, the government of Malaysia introduced the Privatization Policy. The 
Policy was introduced as a continuation of Malaysia’s Incorporation Policy aimed at 
shifting selected government’s authority, investment and holding in certain economic 
activities to the private sector. The ultimate objective of the policy is of achieving 
higher efficiency by allowing private sector’s involvement and resources (Ministry of 
Works, 2008). The Guideline of Privatization (GoP) launched in 1983 became the main 
driving guideline for the national privatization initiative and it specifically defined five  
objectives of the initiative which are rrelieving the government’s financial and 
administrative burden, promoting competition, rising efficiency and productivity, 
accelerating growth, reducing the size and presence of the public sector in the 
economies and meeting the objectives of national policy (the New Economic Policy) 
(EPU, 1985). Among the sector identified for privatization is the provision of 
infrastructure including highway. The national privatization policy was driven by many 
factors such as the increasing expenditure requirement for infrastructure development 
due to the increasing demand for infrastructure facilities. At the same time, the 
government was also facing increasing financial burden to satisfy this need while at the 
same time providing for other sector needs. As such, the GoM decided with the 
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introduction of the Privatization Policy to invite the participation of the private sector to 
design, finance, construct and operate infrastructure projects such as highways to ensure 
the continuation of the benefits that infrastructure projects bring. In return, the GoM 
agreed that the private sector will be repaid for its involvement through charging the 
users of the facilities throughout a mutually agreed period sufficient for it to recoup its 
investment and generate revenue while simultaneously ensuring that the users will not 
be burdened by the charge (Ministry of Works, 2008). This guideline basically is the 
principle of BOT arrangement and with it in place, Malaysia embarked on BOT 
highway development projects. 
 To further clarify its rationale and explain the projects undertaken under the 
privatization initiative, the GoM released another guideline called the Privatization 
Master Plan (PMP) in 1991. In this guideline, the process of privatizing highway 
development was made clear and the BOT arrangement was stated as the method of 
choice for the process. Thus, it can be said that the privatization policy launched in 1983 
and the subsequent release of the two main privatization driving guidelines, the GoP in 
1983 and the PMP in 1991 has been the starting point and enabling force for Malaysia’s 
BOT highway development projects. 
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3.6 BOT Arrangement for Highway Development in Malaysia 
 The introduction of Malaysia’s Privatization Policy in 1983 brought with it the 
transition of provision of transportation infrastructure from the public sector to the 
private sector. Highway development was one of the areas identified for privatization 
initiative and the mechanism of implementing the privatization of highway was through 
the BOT method. Highway development which was previously undertaken by the PWD 
and MHA started to be implemented by the private sector. In 1984, the concept of 
highway privatization in Malaysia came to light with the appointment of the first private 
entity as a concession company to build and operate Malaysia’s first BOT highway 
project, the North Klang Straits Bypass (NKSB). The NKSB was an 8 kilometer, four 
lanes two way highway which connected the Klang Area to the Port of Klang, providing 
a shorter travelling time to and fro the port, a significant benefit especially for 
commercial vehicles and logistic business centered around the port. The agreed 
concession period was for 25 years and on the 21
st
 December 2009, the highway was 
transferred back to the GoM. The development of Malaysian highway through BOT 
arrangement continued with the privatization of the NSE in 1986 when the GoM 
through the MOW announced that the remaining portion of the NSE will be completed 
by BOT method. Since then, other highways in Malaysia have been developed using 
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BOT arrangement.  
 
3.7 Implementation of BOT Highway Development in Malaysia 
 Since 1984, 30 highways have been developed using BOT arrangement in 
Malaysia. Considering that Malaysia is a developing country which had only embarked 
on privatization program in 1983, that achievement can be considered remarkable. To 
understand how Malaysia could manage to successfully utilize BOT as the procurement 
method in providing highway infrastructures, details on the implementation process and 
all aspects around it need to be implored. 
3.7.1 Regulatory Framework  
 The implementation of Malaysian highway networks privatization through 
BOT method is not governed by any specific PPP or BOT act. In contrast, public 
procurement of infrastructure and service in Malaysia is strictly governed by two acts of 
Parliament, Malaysian Treasury Instruction, Circular Letters and Federal Contract 
Circulars (Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 2010). Through these acts and circulars, the 
whole process of government’s procurement of works (infrastructure), services or assets 
is clearly and comprehensively outlined in all stages of its implementation. By having a 
complete regulatory framework, government procurement can be implemented with the 
principles of public accountability, transparency, value for money, open and fair 
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competition and fair dealing as its basis (Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 2010). For 
highway development procured through BOT method, its implementation process is not 
comprehensively stated in any specific act of parliament or government circular. 
However, its implementation is enabled through the combination of these guidelines and 
acts: 
 Malaysia’s Guideline on Privatization 
The Malaysia’s Guideline on Privatization released in 1985 by the Economic 
Planning Unit in The Prime Minister’s Department of Malaysia among others 
outlined the specific objectives of Malaysia’s privatization initiative which are to 
reduce the government’s financial and administrative burden, promote 
competition, raise efficiency and productivity, accelerate growth, reduces 
government’s involvement in the economy and to achieve the targets of the New 
Economic Policy (Economic Planning Unit, 1985). The enabling provision for 
BOT highway development is not literally stated in the guideline. It is however 
implied in one of the forms of privatization outlined in the guideline “Private 
Sector Participation in Activities and Provision of Services” which states: 
“Privatization can also take the form of private sector involvement in 
the provision of certain services or activities, but without any change 
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in the organizational set up of the Government agency responsible for 
the services. This form of privatization essentially either hives-off the 
responsibility for providing the existing services to a private firm 
or company, or a private firm or company can be invited to 
provide new services or facilities to the Government
12
. The 
contracting-out of certain services, e.g. construction work, 
infrastructure services, maintenance work and stevedoring to the 
private sector, are some examples” (Economic Planning Unit, 1985 : 
p.5).  
Furthermore, the Guideline on Privatization also outlined the structure of 
institutional machinery on privatization in Malaysia. The guideline iterated the 
formation of “an Inter-Departmental Committee on Privatization” and four 
technical committees made up of members from various government agencies. 
The former committee is designed to be the authority in charge of the 
formulation; supervision and evaluation of the privatization program while the 
latter on the technical aspects of the privatization. The two committees are 
involved directly in the process of highway privatization which will be described 
                                                     
12 Emphasis is author’s own 
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later in this chapter. 
 
 Malaysia’s Privatization Master Plan 
Malaysia’s Privatization Master Plan (PMP) was released in 1991 with the 
purpose of clarifying to the public about the government’s privatization policy 
so that the public “can participate and understand the government’s privatization 
approaches” (Economic Planning Unit, 1991). Provision for BOT as one of the 
privatization method for implementation was clearly stated in the PMP under the 
“forms of privatization” subheading. The PMP defined BOT as the suitable 
privatization method for infrastructure projects such as highway and water 
supply and expressed one definitive enabling provision for available and future 
BOT highway projects : the provision for the private sector to collect from the 
user or charge them for using the privatized highway along the concession 
period. The PMP also expressed under the ‘project implementation approach’ 
subheading the provision for privatization projects to be initiated by either the 
public or the private sector. In the instance of private sector proposed project, the 
party first proposing the privatization will be granted the priority status under a 
“first come, first serve” basis as a reward for their creativity and ingenuity and if 
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the proposal complies with the uniqueness and compatibility guidelines, the 
proposer will be awarded with exclusivity status allowing it to proceed to further 
stages of feasibility study, detailed proposal and further negotiation with the 
government and finally being awarded the concession (Economic Planning Unit, 
1991). 
 Federal Roads (Private Management) Act 1984 
The Malaysian Federal Roads (Private Management) Act 1984 (also known as 
Act 306) is the act of parliament gazetted with the purpose of empowering the 
concession company in BOT highway development to “demand, collect and 
retain tolls in respect of a Federal road, bridge or ferry, and for matters 
connected therewith” . The provision of this act is granting the power to the 
Minister in charge of federal roads (The Minister of Works) to authorise any 
party (concession company) to charge users of the federal road they constructed, 
upgraded, repaired or maintained and keep the toll collected along a stipulated 
and agreed period as a return for the works they undertook in developing the 
road (Malaysian Federal Roads (Private Management) Act 1984). The other 
clauses in this act simply outline the characteristics of BOT arrangement such as 
the duty of the party authorised to collect toll (the concessionaire) to maintain 
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and upgrade the road along the concession period and clarified other matters 
pertaining to the toll collection such as the parties exempted from paying the toll 
and the penalty for user who do not pay the stipulated toll charges. 
 
3.7.2 Agencies Involved in BOT Highway Development in Malaysia 
 Highway developed under BOT scheme is Malaysia is considered part of 
federal road networks. As such, the Minister of Works has the authority on several 
matters concerning the toll highways as stipulated in the The Malaysian Federal Roads 
(Private Management) Act 1984. The functions of the Minister of Works on matters 
pertaining to toll highways are delegated to the MOW and MHA accordingly. However, 
for matters related to the implementation of BOT scheme in highway development such 
as formulation of policy, evaluating BOT proposal and negotiating BOT implementation, 
the spearheading agency is the PPP Unit under the Prime Minister’s Department of 
Malaysia. Furthermore, other agencies such as the Ministry of Finance and Attorney 
General’s Chamber (AGC) of Malaysia are also involved, the former in matters relating 
to toll collection and government compensation to concessionaire companies while the 
latter in legal matters such as the drafting of concession agreement (CA). There is no 
dedicated BOT regulating or controlling agency undertaking all the functions related to 
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BOT implementation in Malaysia. As such, some degree of overlap could occur in the 
functions of the agencies involved in BOT highway implementation in Malaysia. The 
agencies in question are: 
 
 Public Private Partnership Unit, Prime Minister’s Department 
The Public Private Partnership Unit (3PU) under the Prime Minister’s 
Department of Malaysia was previously the privatization section under the 
Economic Planning Unit. The Unit was established in 1983 after the launch of 
Malaysia’s Privatization Policy as the secretariat for the Privatization Committee 
which comprises of members from various government agencies with the role of 
evaluating and recommending privatization proposals for the Cabinet’s Approval. 
Pertaining to BOT scheme implementation for highway (and other PPP project ) 
development, the 3PU’s functions are as follows:- 
 
i. Legislating the policy and strategy for PPP (including BOT) 
implementation  
ii. Planning, implementing, coordinating, monitoring and evaluating BOT 
initiative 
iii. Review and evaluate technical and financial proposal of BOT initiative 
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with the assistance of relevant technical agency 
iv. Prepare and improve the guideline and procedures of BOT 
implementation from time to time 
v. Negotiate the terms and conditions of the concession agreement for 
BOT project with the assistance of the AGC of Malaysia. 
 
 Ministry Of Works 
The MOW plays several roles in BOT highway implementation in Malaysia. 
As highways are part of the federal road network, MOW is generally 
responsible for the planning and development of highway networks. 
Specifically, two sections under MOW, the Highway Planning Unit (HPU) 
and the Development and Privatization section have direct functions in 
highway development. The role played by the Development and Privatization 
section of MOW is more of a monitoring role and also the secretarial role 
between the Cabinet and Minister of Works in BOT highway matters. The 
outlined functions of this section are monitoring the MHA’s obligation in 
determining toll rate and toll operation, monitoring the development of BOT 
highway projects and preparing cabinet paper and ministerial note on matters 
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related to highway development. The HPU’s roles in BOT highway 
development on the other hand are more of planning and forecasting. Among 
its roles are planning the national highway and road networks policy, 
executing feasibility study to determine viability of proposed projects, 
monitor the development of new highway and creating traffic projection for 
new highway projects. 
 Malaysian Highway Authority 
At the time of its creation in 1980, MHA’s role in highway development was 
of being the implementer or developer of highway projects. The outlined 
functions during its establishment were to supervise and implement the design, 
construction, control, operation and maintenance of highways, charge and 
collect tolls and to create regulations related to highways. However, with the 
launch of the Privatization Policy in 1983 and beginning of highway 
privatization, the role of MHA shifted from being the implementer to the 
monitoring agency. As such, in relation to highway development using BOT 
arrangement in Malaysia, MHA’s roles are: 
i. Monitoring the operation of highways and toll collection in Malaysia 
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ii. Planning and research to ensure the efficient usage of highways and 
other facilities along them 
3.7.3 BOT highway Implementation Process 
BOT highway project as well as other privatization initiative in Malaysia is 
regulated by the Malaysian Guideline of Privatization and Privatization Master Plan. 
Therefore, implementation process for BOT highway development is bound by the 
provisions of these guidelines. Prior to starting any privatization initiative, the GoP 
dictated that the agencies planning to privatize need to carefully undertake the task of 
identifying and choosing the “service or interest to be privatized” ((Economic Planning 
Unit, 1985 : p.6). The identification and selection process for any privatization initiative 
must be based on these outlined factors: 
 Profitability and Privatization 
 Social Objectives of Basic Services and Maximization of Profits 
 Costs and Benefits of Privatization 
 Structure and Performance of Industry 
 Assessing Extent of Duplication and Need for Co-Ordination 
 Feasibility of Fragmentation 
 Special Characteristics of Services 
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Privatization initiative in Malaysia (including BOT highway projects) can be 
initiated by both the government and the public sector (Economic Planning Unit, 1991: 
Para 85). Yaacob and Naidu (1997) characterized this duality as a “unique aspect of 
Malaysian privatization policy” (p.46). Depending on the initiator of the privatization 
project, the process will have a different implementation path at the beginning before 
converging at negotiation and approval level. In determining which highway alignment 
or project to build, the GoM’s decision can be based on the Highway Networks 
Development Plan (HNDP), prepared by the Highway Planning Unit under the MOW  
in 1993 with the cooperation of JICA (Highway Planning Unit, 2006).  The HNDP 
outlined the policy, strategy, cost estimation for identified highway projects and 
implementation priority. Examples of highway projects developed based on the 
recommendation of this Plan are Phase 1 of East Coast Highway, Port 
Dickson-Seremban Expressway and South Klang Valley Expressway (Highway 
Planning Unit, 2006: p 26). After the identification, the GoM can either select or appoint 
a private entity to implement the project or instruct the EPU to either negotiate directly 
with a chosen private company or offer the project on a selective tender exercise 
(Yaacob and Naidu, 1997). The selected private company will then need to carry out on 
its own a feasibility study and comprehensive proposal. The submitted proposal will 
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then be evaluated by the two committees (financial and technical) under the National 
Privatization Committee who will later produce a recommendation to the Cabinet of 
Malaysia for approval. The cabinet will, upon consideration and advice from the 
National Privatization Committee approves or disapproves the proposal. For approved 
proposal, it will be negotiated thoroughly among the various government agencies 
involved and the private sector proposer to the point of a final proposal is achieved and 
resubmitted to the Cabinet for its approval. If the Cabinet accepts the proposal, a 
concession agreement will be put in place for the government and the private company 
to establish the legal, working agreement on the highway development. 
For private sector initiated BOT highway development, the process starts with 
submission of unsolicited privatization proposal from the private company. While the 
government initiated proposal may be based on the HNDP, the private sector’s 
proposals usually are not. These proposals are often not based on any road plan thus 
resulting in difficulty for the government to compare and ensure their justification and 
priority (ADB, 2000). Submitted proposal will go through a preliminary evaluation 
stage by the 3PU to determine its worthiness and upon the determination, the proposing 
company will receive a degree of exclusivity and a letter of intent declaring the 
government’s approval for the company to follow through its proposal with detailed 
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proposal and feasibility study. A salient feature of this route of project proposal is that it 
is based on ‘first come, first serve’ principle and usually the proposing party is given the 
exclusive right to implement the project (Yaacob and Naidu, 1997). In Malaysia, 
unsolicited proposals are openly accepted by the government. As the government does 
not have an established system of allowing competitive bidding for unsolicited proposal 
such as ‘Swiss Challenge’ or bonus system, the proposal received are usually accepted, 
evaluated and the proposers are given the preferred status to proceed with the proposals. 
After the private company have follow up its first submission with a detailed, second 
submission and feasibility study, the process will follow the same flow of government 
initiated project where it will go through rounds of negotiation involving the private 
company and various government agencies resulting in a final proposal which will later 
be presented to the Cabinet to either accept or reject. For both government and private 
sector initiated BOT highway development, signing of concession agreement will occur 
after the Cabinet has approved the proposed project.  
The next phase in the development process after the concession agreement is 
effective will be the actual physical development starting with land acquisition. The 
process of land acquisition in BOT highway development in Malaysia will be 
undertaken by the government through MHA with the costs incurred in land acquisition 
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exercise borne by the concession company. With access to the land on which the 
highway alignment is to be built granted, the next process will be the actual construction 
up to completion. The government through MHA will monitor the construction process 
and upon completion will issue a certificate called ‘Sijil Kesempurnaan Pembinaan 
Lebuh Raya’ (Certificate of Perfect Highway Construction) in recognition of the 
completion and the construction quality of the highway
13
. The completed highway will 
then be gazetted as a federal, tolled highway before it can be open for use. The highway 
will then be operated and maintained by the concession company along the stipulated 
concession period before being transferred back to the government. The process form 
initiation until approval of the cabinet is illustrated in figure 3.4 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
13 http://www.llmnet.gov.my/serverpages/common/iso.aspx 
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3.7.4 Toll Rate Determination in Malaysia’s BOT Highway Projects 
 The determination of toll rate in Malaysia’s highway projects is the result of 
Concession Company’s bid and negotiation with the government. The GoM has 
incorporated a number of elements in the toll rate determination exercise to support its 
policy of promoting social equality (ADB,2000: appendix 1, p.16). For example, to 
promote the use of public transportation service, the toll rates for buses are set lower 
than cars. In recognition of the large number of motorcycle users in Malaysia which 
Figure 3.4 :BOT highway implementation process in Malaysia 
Source : PPP Unit (3PU), Prime Minister’s Department 
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represented the lower and middle income group, no toll is charged on them while some 
highways have dedicated motorcycle lanes for their usage. Toll rate is different for 
different type of vehicle and the vehicle classification for toll rate determination in 
Malaysian highway is as follows; class 1 for vehicle with two axles with three or four 
wheels (cars and trucks excluding taxi), class 2 for vehicles with two axles with five or 
six wheel (excluding bus), class 3 for vehicles with 3 or more axles, class 4 for taxis and 
class 5 for buses. For toll rate calculation, it is stipulated that class 2 vehicles’ rates will 
be twice the rate of class 1 vehicles, class 3 vehicles thrice the rate of class 1 vehicles 
while class 4 vehicles (taxis) are charged half the rate of class 1 vehicles (private car). 
 The toll rate in Malaysian BOT highway projects is one of the mechanisms in 
place to protect the projects’ cash inflows against the risk of inflation. This has been 
observed in the first BOT highway project in Malaysia, the NSE (Kleimeier, 1996) and 
is still in effect in other subsequent highway projects. Klemeier (1996) explained this in 
the case of the NSE where the toll rate determination is based on price-indexation 
connected to inflation rate. As such, some form of protection for the concession 
company against domestic cost increment and exchange rate fluctuation exists in the toll 
rate determination (Fishfein & Babbar, 1996).  In practice, the 3PU as the main 
regulating agency for BOT highway will consider the determination of the toll rate 
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based on its consideration of acceptable rate of return. Toll rate is calculated in per 
kilometer basis for each class of vehicle (ADB,2000: appendix 1, p.16).  
 A salient aspect of Malaysia’s highway toll rate is its increased is allowed 
(subject to the government’s approval) and guaranteed in the CA. The toll rate increase 
is set at five percent every three years for some highways and every five years for others 
(Low toll rates a great deal for rakyat, 2011). Malaysia’s toll rate increase is allowed 
based on the CA on a determined interval. However, the government’s approval for such 
raise is needed before it can be implemented. Toll rate calculation is incorporated in the 
CA based on the determined per kilometer rate. The toll rate at the start of its operating 
period is agreed upon and listed as toll rate schedule in the concession agreement while 
for the consecutive period, the toll rate will be determined through a process of 
concessionaire applying for new toll rate to the government, with detail calculation of 
its revenue collected for the previous operating period and an audited confirmation of 
such calculation six months before the new toll rates is to be imposed for the 
government to approve (Government of Malaysia, 2007: article 15.2). The toll rate per 
kilometer for private vehicles in some of Malaysia’s highways ranges from 12 sen (East 
Coast Highway) to 14.96 sen (Kajang-Seremban Highway) (Ministry of Works, 2008). 
 
89 
 
3.8 Case Study 1: The North South Expressway (NSE) 
 To further clarify the implementation process of BOT highway development in 
Malaysia, this research will study the development of Malaysia’s North South 
Expressway from its inception to now and all of its related issues and problems. As the 
biggest BOT highway development in Malaysia to date, the NSE has been viewed as the 
most profitable highway and a resounding success (ADB, 2000) and the most successful 
(Handley, 1997). To date, no other BOT highway development in Malaysia has been 
undertaken with the same project size as the NSE, which is shown in table 3.2 below: 
Project Description Construction of 500 kilometer of new 
alignment and rehabilitation of 370km of 
existing highway facilities (initially built 
by the government) 
Construction Period 1986 – 1994 (overall completion) 
Project Length/ Capacity 870 kilometer/ 4-6 lanes 
Total Cost at construction (million USD) 3,192 
Total Cost per kilometer at construction 
(million USD) 
3.7 (inclusive of land acquisition cost for 
both privatized and government built 
portion and O&M cost for both portion) 
Concession Period 48 years 
Table 3.2 : Details of the NSE project 
Source: Malaysian Highway Authority 
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 In 1977, the GoM decided on the development of a new highway linking the 
North Border of Malaysia to the South Border to facilitate the growing traffic volume 
which can no longer be accommodated efficiently by the available Federal Route 
number 1. According to REAM (as cited in Ensor, 2004), the situation is verified by the 
HNDP undertaken in 1993 which showed that three corridors of the federal road 
networks were ‘heavily trafficked’, including the north-south federal route in the West 
Coast of Peninsular Malaysia. Three other locations along the route namely Penang, the 
Klang Valley and Johor Bahru were also experiencing large traffic convergence (Ensor, 
2004). The NSE was initiated by the government in 1977 with physical work starting in 
1980 under the supervision of the newly established MHA. Between 1980 and 1985, the 
MHA has managed to complete the construction of several phases of the project 
amounting to the total length of 366 kilometer or 41% out of the proposed 823 
kilometer highway. In term of cost, the amount of work completed as a public 
infrastructure project by the MHA was at RM 3.2 Billion (Santhiman, 2011). In 1983, 
the GoM launched the Privatization Policy followed by the Guideline of Privatization in 
1985. However, it was also in 1985 when Malaysia was badly affected by the 
international economic recession which resulted in negative economic growth for the 
country (Jomo and Syn, n.d.). Resulting from the economic recession, the public funded 
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NSE project was facing significant financial problems and the GoM was no longer 
capable of continuing the project and finishing it within the estimated period (Hensley 
and White, 1993). The economic situation could have possibly caused delay and deter 
the completion of the project (Klemeier, 1996). With the release of the GoP outlining 
the objectives and implementation methods of privatization compounded with the 
economic situation, the GoM decided to complete the remaining portion of the NSE 
through privatization, specifically utilizing BOT approach. Jomo and Syn (n.d.) stated 
that Malaysia’s privatization approach for highway includes the ‘enabling the 
imposition of tolls on roads previously built by the MHA’ (p.11). In the case of NSE, the 
decision to complete the project through BOT approach included the authorization for 
the selected concession company to collect toll from the previously completed portion 
as revenue stream for the project (Kelimeier, 1996: p.189).  
 The identification and selection of what to be privatized in the case of the NSE 
was clearly undertaken by the government. Thus, the NSE was one of the BOT highway 
developments in Malaysia initiated by the public sector. The GoM through the MOW 
called for tender in February 1986 for the privatization of the NSE which included 
construction of the remaining unfinished portion and operating the finished section of 
the highway (Joe, 2009). Tender was offered to six pre-qualified companies but only 
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five submitted their proposals. The five companies were Pilecon Engineering Berhad, 
United Engineers Malaysia Sdn Bhd, Shahpadu Holding Sdn Bhd, Unico Holdings Sdn 
Bhd and Pembinaan Hasbuddin (M) Sdn Bhd. One out the five proposals received, only 
three proposals were considered for further evaluation (Joe, 2009: Para 9). To 
understand the selection process of the proposing companies in the NSE development, 
the characteristics of bid price, financial support required from the government, 
proposed toll rate per kilometer, proposed concession period, estimated toll collection 
total and company’s experience in highway building need to be clearly shown. These 
characteristics for the three companies are illustrated in Table 3.3 below: 
 
 
Pilecon Hashbudin UEM 
Bid Characteristics 
Bid Price  RM 3.372 Billion RM 3 Billion RM 3.5 Billion 
Financial Support 
required from the 
government 
RM 498 Million 
standby credit 
None, only require 
government support 
for their  commercial 
loans 
RM 1.65 Billion 
support loan 
Proposed toll rate per 
kilometer 
7 sen 5 sen 7.5 sen 
Proposed Concession 
period 
25 years 22 years 25 years 
(extended to 30 
years) 
Estimated Toll 
Collection Total 
RM 18-19 Billion RM 17.9 Billion RM 34 Billion 
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Experience in highway 
construction 
Yes Yes No 
Table 3.3: Characteristics of The Proposals Received For NSE Privatization Exercise 
Source : Adapted from (Joe, 2009) 
 
 The GoM chose to award the project to UEM despite the fact that UEM’s offer 
was the most expensive and requires the highest amount of government’s financial 
support. The reason or criteria was never disclosed to the public (Fishfein and Babbar, 
1996). The concession awarded to UEM was for a period of 30 years and it included the 
authorization to operate and charge toll from the users of the highway portion already 
completed by the MHA (Klemeier, 1996). Hensley and White( 1993) observed that 
under the concession awarded, UEM’s obligations are to finance, construct, maintain 
and operate the completed section of the highway and to complete the construction of 
the remaining portion in seven years The selection of UEM as the concession company 
for the NSE project invited some criticisms based on the fact that the company was not 
the strongest bidder if measured by its experience in building operating highway and its 
financial condition (Hensley and White, 199: p.81). UEM then proceeded with setting 
up a subsidiary company named PLUS (Projek Lebuhraya Utara Selatan or North South 
Expressway Project) to be the main concessionaire company for the project. The project 
was financed in its entirety by local funding. Klemeier (1996) gave the financing detail 
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of the NSE project which was RM 2.086 billion loan provided by 45 Malaysian local 
banks, RM 500 million in self provided equity and RM 1.65 Billion in the form of 
support loan from the GoM. 
   Based on the conditions leading to the awarding of concession to PLUS, 
several traits that later will be demonstrated in other BOT highway developments in 
Malaysia can be seen. The traits were the lack of transparency in selection of concession 
company, no regulatory framework for bidding and selection and heavy government 
involvement in from of support and assistance to the concession company to ensure 
project success. The NSE should be a project fraught with many risks considering it was 
the first, large scale BOT highway development implemented in Malaysia, the 
concession company selected was not the strongest of the bidder and the time of the 
inception was that of an international economic recession. However, to ensure the 
project success, Klemeier (1996) observed that these risks mitigation measures were 
taken during the project implementation: 
 To complement the concession company’s lack of experience in building 
highway, construction works were broken down into 44 packages and they 
appointed experienced and capable contractors such as Mitsui form Japan, 
Taylor Woodrow International from the United Kingdom and Dragagnes et 
95 
 
Travaux from France. Some works were also sub contracted to local contractors. 
Dividing works into smaller packages reduced the risk of total project failure as 
works were undertaken and completed in phases. To further ensure the 
subcontractor’s performance, sub-contractors were given the option of payment 
in the form of cash and equity shares, which can be transformed into voting 
shares or sold in the local bourse. This strategy worked in ensuring 
sub-contactor’s performance by providing them with the motivation to perform 
well as their performance will affect the project success and in turn the value of 
their shares. 
 To counter the risk of output demand and price risk, toll structure which clearly 
differentiated the classes of vehicles using the highway and indexed to inflation 
rates was incorporated into the concession agreement. Output demand risk was 
softened by the availability of only one other parallel road network to the 
highway, the Federal Route number 1 which provided a less efficient alternative 
in term of travelling time compared to the NSE. With the increasing traffic 
volume projected, more users were expected to utilize the NSE and enable it to 
achieve the traffic projection. Nevertheless, the project also benefited from 
government’s minimum revenue guarantee should there be traffic shortfall as 
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this clause was also incorporated into the concession agreement. 
 Rate variability risks were countered through several special measures such as 
tying the toll rates to the fluctuation of price index which effectively guarded the 
project against inflation risk, establishing a financing structure made up totally 
of local currency to evade currency risk and having a government guarantee of 
limiting interest rate at 20 percent on loan as a solution to interest rate risk. 
 The project was not so much facing much country risks which were made up of 
political risk and economic risk. In the former, Malaysia was politically stable 
during the construction period and the concession company was strongly 
connected to the ruling political party thus making it quite resistant towards 
political risks. The latter includes components such as economic stability, the 
risk was not so visible due to the favorable economic ranking of Malaysia in the 
Euromoney country risk ranking system at the time of construction (Klemeier, 
1996: p. 193). 
 Despite all the risk mitigation measures put in place during the construction 
phase of the NSE, the actual performance of the project was not entirely glitch free as it 
should have been. The project incurred cost overrun up to 70 percent (Fishfein & 
Babbar, 1996) above the projected cost. In term of political risk, the project faced strong 
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objection from the opposition political party who claimed that the lack of transparency 
in the selection process was an act of corruption of the government (Joe, 2009). The 
project however was successfully completed in 1993 in spite of all the problems.  
 The completion of the NSE and start of its operation brought with it many 
benefits such as “positive impact on the economic and social geography of Malaysia 
and has attracted a huge, growing traffic” (ADB,2000: appendix 1, p.13). In summary 
the NSE was enjoying the assistance of the GoM in the form of support loan amounting 
to RM1.65 Billion for a 10 year period, minimum revenue guarantee in the form of 
traffic volume supplement along the first 17 years of the concession period and 
additional risk supplement for unfavorable exchange rate or interest rate fluctuation also 
during the first 17 years of concession (Hensley and White,1993). However, opinions 
varies on whether the NSE is indeed a successful BOT highway project or otherwise. 
ADB (2000) described it as a successful project only because of the utilization of the 
government assets in the form of the completed highway portion which provided PLUS 
with a revenue stream. Hensley and White (1993) labeled it a success in term of 
achieving the outlined Malaysia’s privatization objectives of reducing government 
financial commitment in infrastructure provision, shifting public sector’s 
responsibilities to the private sector and using a new innovative approach towards 
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project realization. Handley (1997) argued that the success of the NSE project must be 
measured against the facts that it’s selection and award process was shrouded in secrecy 
and non-disclosure, with no competitive methods which heavily prioritized firm with 
connection to the ruling political power and the amount of public sector financial 
assistance does not reflect well on the achievement of basic privatization objectives of 
reducing public sector’s involvement and expenditure in infrastructure development. 
 In term of relative efficiency/inefficiency between the implemented BOT 
system and the public procurement approach used in the development of the NSE 
project, the comparison is as follows:- 
 Publicly procured portion  
(by MHA) 
BOT portion (by UEM) 
Constructed Length 370 Kilometer 500 Kilometer 
Land Acquisition Cost Not Available (Fully Borne 
by the Government) 
Not Available (Fully Borne 
by the Government) 
Construction Cost RM 3.32 Billion RM 3.5 Billion at award, 
increased to almost RM 6 
Billion at completion 
Construction Period 5 years 7 years (5 years at award) 
Project Scope Construction and O&M Construction and O&M 
Table 3.4 : Comparison between publicly procured portion and BOT portion of the NSE 
Source : Malaysian Highway Authority and Joe (2009) 
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Based on the comparison between the construction cost of the publicly procured part 
and the BOT part of the NSE project, it can be seen that the desired efficiency of 
privatizing the NSE project was not effectively achieved. Due to risks effecting the 
project and compounded with the selection of relatively inexperienced and financially 
not strong concession company, the BOT portion of the expressway was only completed 
after 7 years of award and it experienced cost increase up to RM 6 Billion from the 
awarded amount of RM 3.5 Billion. 
 One of the ongoing issues with the implementation process of the NSE is the 
problem of toll charges. In the case of the NSE, the government had overprotected the 
private sector from risk by guaranteeing its profitability through loans, exchange rate 
and minimum revenue guarantee which resulted in the less successful risk transfer from 
the public to the private sector (Naidu, 1995). The incorporation of toll increase 
entitlement clause in the concession agreement has caused ongoing problem to the 
government as it allows for upward revision of toll rates, something the public does not 
approve of (Aziz, 2002). The objective for the incorporation of toll rate increase 
entitlement clause was to allow PLUS to better absorb the financing costs and growing 
maintenance and service charges. Aziz (2002) stated that the toll rate increment 
proposed by PLUS to the government was at 33% in 1996 and subsequently another 6% 
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annually for the following two years. The proposal was met with negative reaction by 
the people and this caused the GoM to renegotiate with PLUS on the increase and the 
result was PLUS agreeing to revise the increase the proposed hike and the GoM ended 
up paying compensation to PLUS on its revenue loss the amount of RM 100 million 
(Aziz, 2002: p.2). 
 In 2011, the Malaysian Employee Provident Fund (EPF) which is the country’s 
main pension fund and UEM Berhad completed the buying of all assets and liabilities of 
PLUS Expressway Berhad (the concessionaire for NSE) (Eu, 2011). This move has 
effectively gives the government more control of the NSE and its operation (Low Toll 
Rates a great deal for rakyat, 2011). 
 
3.9 Case Study 2 : The Kuala Lumpur-Kuala Selangor Highway 
 The Kuala Lumpur-Kuala Selangor Highway (LATAR) is the newest highway 
in operation in Malaysia. The concession was awarded to Kuala Lumpur-Kuala 
Selangor Expressway Berhad (KLKSEB) in 1997 through BOT scheme arrangement 
but due to the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the project did not took off until it was 
revived in 2008 with a new supplemental agreement signed with the government 
(Arulampalam, 2011). Construction of the highway started in 2008 and it was 
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completed and opened to public on 23
rd
 of June 2011. Toll collection for the highway 
officially started on 1
st
 September 2011 after being toll free right after it opened. The 33 
kilometer highway is linking Kuala Lumpur and Kuala Selangor district and its 
development was aimed as an alternative and to reduce traffic congestion on federal 
route number 54 with the concession period of 40 years
14
. The highway is a green field 
project of developing dual lane, at grade expressway and its development was initiated 
by the concession company (unsolicited proposal). 
 The highway was built at the cost of RM 958 Million. The highway 
development was financed by domestic and foreign funding in the form of RM 1.04 
Billion total loan secured from Malaysian Development Bank and Islamic Development 
Bank (Arulampalam, 2011). The traffic volume projection for the highway for the year 
2011 was 60,000 vehicles daily (Jayaraj, 2011). However, after the commencement of 
toll collection, the actual traffic volume was 30,000 vehicles daily (Idris, 2011).  
 The concession agreement (CA) for this highway dictated that the land 
acquisition will be undertaken by the government while any cost involved with land 
acquisition shall be borne by the concession company. However, the government 
provided RM 65 Million to the concession company for ‘Reimbursable Land Cost’ in 
                                                     
14 From LATAR’s website http://www.latar.com.my/FAQs.htm 
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connection to land acquisition which must be repaid by the company in ten installments 
spanning a ten year repayment period. Another form of government’s assistance 
includes the granting for the concession company to apply for financial assistance from 
the GoM’s investment arm. The toll rate for the highway was already determined before 
the construction start and the toll rate is scheduled to increase very five years. In the 
case of non approved increase, the government will compensate the concession 
company for any reduction in the toll collection. The CA also clearly stated that 
government’s compensation to the concession company will be considered its revenue.  
 For the purpose of measuring the relative efficiency/inefficiency of this BOT 
highway project, this research will make a comparative analysis between this project 
(The Kuala Lumpur-Kuala Selangor Highway) and another highway project which is 
developed using public procurement system which the East Coast Expressway phase 2. 
The latter which started constructed about the same time as the case study is a part of 
the East Coast Expressway phase 2 project which has been divided into two portions, 
one being developed using public procurement while the other using BOT system. The 
comparison between both projects is as follows:- 
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 Kuala Lumpur-Kuala 
Selangor Highway (BOT) 
East Coast Expressway 
phase 2 (Public 
Procurement) 
Project Length 
(Kilometer) 
33 120 
Contract/ Package Single Divided into 16 smaller 
contracts/ packages 
Land Acquisition Cost RM 65 Million (borne by the 
government, to be repaid by 
the concessionaire) 
RM 97 Million (borne by 
the government) 
Project Cost RM 958 Million RM 1.44 Billion 
Project Length 3 Years (2008-2011) 8 Years (2006-2014) 
Project Scope Design, Construction and 
O&M 
Construction only 
Table 3.5 : Comparison between KL-KS highway (BOT) and East Coast expressway 
Phase 2 (publicly procured) 
Source : Malaysian Highway Authority and Public Works Department Malaysia 
 
Based on the comparison in Table 3.5 above, the Kuala Lumpur-Kuala Selangor 
highway project displayed a high degree of efficiency particularly in term of cost and 
construction period. Being the newest BOT highway in operation in Malaysia and with 
the relatively small project size (compared to the NSE project), this project in some 
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ways have successfully achieved the desired efficiency. It is also worth noting that the 
concession company for this highway project, KLSEB is backed by Bina Puri Holdings 
Berhad which holds 60% of its stake
15
 whereas Bina Puri Holdings Berhad is a 
relatively experienced construction company with sound financial capability and has 
been awarded several times by the Construction Industry Development Board of 
Malaysia (CIDB) for its successful achievements
16
. In this particular case (the Kuala 
Lumpur-Kuala Selangor highway), the selection of right concession company could 
have in influenced the efficiency and the success rate of the BOT project. 
 
  
  
                                                     
15 http://www.latar.com.my/corp_info.htm 
16 http://www.binapuri.com.my/AU01_Intro.html 
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CHAPTER 4 : ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BOT METHOD IN 
HIGHWAY DEVELOPMENT IN MALAYSIA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 This chapter will analyze the how Malaysia implement BOT method in 
developing its highways based on the process described and case studies reviewed in the 
previous chapter. Firstly, as the research question implied, the analysis will be on how 
the implementation of BOT method in Malaysia’s highway development fares as a 
process by using a business process framework analysis. The second purpose of the 
analysis is to examine how the BOT implementation in Malaysia fits into suggested 
good implementation framework as suggested by several literatures available on BOT 
implementation. The analysis will also attempt to illustrate how certain prominent traits 
in the Malaysian implementation process differ from what is practiced in other countries 
and how the differences affect it. 
 
4.2 Analysis of Malaysia’s BOT Highway Development as a Process 
 The Malaysian BOT highway development as it is implemented in shows that it 
follows certain procedures and guided by guidelines and regulations. Although based on 
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the case studies discussed in the previous chapter there seems to be certain 
shortcomings to the procedures which resulted in questionable practices and relatively 
inefficient outcomes, nevertheless, some form of systematic sequence of procedures are 
indeed apparent in the implementation. This research therefore intends to analyze the 
implementation of BOT highway development in Malaysia in the viewpoint of a process. 
According to Davis (2009), a simple definition of process is “definition of the tasks and 
the sequence of those tasks necessary to fulfill an objective”. Further definition of 
process as sequences of actions or procedures with the objective of producing 
something of value, be it a product or service, to party or organization external to the 
procedures while simultaneously benefiting the entity or organization undertaking the 
procedures itself (Davis, 2009: p.1). By this definition, the BOT highway 
implementation in Malaysia fits it perfectly as the sequence of activities as discussed in 
chapter 3 are undertaken by the concession company and the government (both being 
internal parties in the process) with the goal of providing working highway 
infrastructure benefiting the government and end users (external parties) while at the 
same time bringing value to the organizations undertaking the process (the concession 
company and the government). Davis suggested that a process can be elucidated in a  
model which cleary outlines the definition and flow of tasks, the resource requirements, 
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operating environment and the goals they attain. By using this process model analysis as 
suggested by Davis (2009) to analyse the implementation of BOT method in highway 
developments in Malaysia, it is clear that the implementation does fit for a systematic 
and organized process, as represented in figure 4.1 below: 
 
 
  
        Controls  
 
 
 
              Objectives 
 
 
 
Input          Output 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Resources 
Process 
(Initiation, proposal received, 
evaluation, award, concession 
agreement, construction and 
operation) 
Money 
Design 
Guideline on 
Privatization 
 
PMP 
Regulatory 
Framework 
Manpower Equipment 
Operational 
Highway 
Efficiency 
Agencies 
Proposal 
Figure 4.1 : Analysis of Malaysia’s BOT Highway Implementation Using Good Process  
     Model 
Source : Adapted after Davis (2009) 
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Further suggested by Davis on a good process model is that it should be effective, 
efficient, relevant, valid, usable, used, reused, managed and measured (p.2). Analyzing 
the implementation process of BOT highway development in Malaysia using the 
suggested criteria shows how the process fares against the criteria as follows:- 
Criteria The Malaysian BOT Highway Development Process 
Effective The highway development process using BOT method in Malaysia has 
been relatively effective in attaining the objective of providing highway 
infrastructure through the participation of private sector. The success of 
developing 30 highway networks amounting to 1600 kilometers of 
operational highway can be a measure of its effectiveness. 
Efficient The efficiency of BOT highway development process in Malaysia is 
questionable as some highways have shown that the desired efficiency 
has not been fully achieved. However, the hit and miss situation is the 
result of questionable practice and incorporation of national policy in its 
implementation. 
Relevant The relevancy of the process in the context of highway development 
using BOT system is proven by its effectiveness. 
Valid The process have been validated and verified with the government’s 
objective and the private sector’s need. 
Usable The process has indeed been usable for obtaining highway infrastructure 
through BOT method. 
Reusable The same process have been used for all the BOT highway development 
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projects in Malaysia in the 25 years time span albeit some weaknesses 
in its implementation, thus proving its repeatability. 
Managed The process of highway development using BOT system in Malaysia is 
managed by several government agencies undertaking various aspects 
of it with the guideline of the regulations in place. 
Measured The relevant agencies in charge of BOT highway development process 
in Malaysia have been measuring the process through respective KPI. 
For the private sector, business measure such as the toll collection 
revenue and traffic volume growth has been implemented. 
 
Table 4.1 : Comparison of Malaysia’s process of BOT highway development and  
   suggested good process model criteria as suggested by Davis (2009) 
Source : Adapted after Davis (2009) 
 
 Using Davis’ suggested model of process and criteria of good process model, 
the Malaysian approach of highway development using BOT system fits the description 
of being a process in which it is systematic and repeatable in obtaining the output of 
highway provision through PPP. However, as process is made up of components of 
inputs, resources and controls, weakness or flaw in any of the component will affect its 
desired output. In Malaysia’s case, as shown by the case studies, questionable practice 
due to the incorporation of national policy in the process has resulted in questionable 
achievement of the process’ objective that is efficiency.  
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4.3 Review Of Prominent Characteristics in Malaysia’s BOT highway 
 Between 1985 and 2011 Malaysia has managed to develop a highway network 
consisting of 25 different alignments with the total length of approximately 1600 
kilometer. Based on the projects successfully completed, some noticeable traits that can 
be observed. These traits have been described as peculiarity or uniqueness of Malaysia’s 
way of implementing BOT scheme in its highway developments (Yaacob & Naidu, 
1997). However, a deeper view of these characteristics will enable further 
comprehension on how they affect the implementation, what are the results of their 
incorporation into Malaysia’s BOT highway project and how, by comparing with 
practice of other BOT implementing nations, can Malaysia improve on its way. For this 
research, the prominent traits of BOT scheme implementation in highway developments 
in Malaysia that has been selected for further analysis are the lack of specific, 
controlling BOT act or statute of law, the propensity towards unsolicited proposals and 
their handling, and government’s measures to protect the concession company from 
risks. 
4.4 Suggested Good Implementation Framework for BOT  
 Numerous literature available on the topic of BOT and its implementation 
especially in infrastructure development indicated that BOT has become the method of 
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choice for many countries in the world, all with the similar outcome of provision of 
large scale, resource and technically intensive infrastructure projects by the private 
sector for the utilization of the public by which the private sector is granted the right to 
recoup their investment through charging the users of the infrastructures (Levy, 1996 : 
p.22). Some of the literatures available suggested elements that must exist in BOT 
implementation to guarantee its success (Levy D. A., 1996), while a number suggest the 
measures that must be taken by all the parties involved to achieve the goal of BOT 
(McCarthy and Tiong, 1991), (Kumaraswamy & Zhang, 2001) and (Tiong, Bot 
Projects : Risks and Securities, 1990). Based on these and some other supporting 
literatures, this research will attempt to propose a good implementation matrix 
consisting of the ideas and suggestion of those literatures. Further, to determine how 
well Malaysia’s implementation process compares to the suggestions, corresponding 
aspects of Malaysia’s BOT process in highway development review will be contrasted 
against them. Table 4.1 shows the suggested good BOT practice framework matrix and 
Malaysia’s own process in comparison: 
Suggested Elements of Good 
BOT Implementation  
Malaysia’s Implementation Practice 
BOT law governing its 
implementation 
No specific BOT law or statute, implementation 
governed by non-regulating guideline, legal act in 
connection only limited to the empowerment of toll 
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collection by concessionaire. 
 
Competitive procurement 
approach  such as tendering  
Very few application of tendering, majority of projects 
applied single party, direct negotiation process. 
Transparency in all 
implementation stages 
especially during selection 
Preference of disclosure, selection criteria not made 
public, concession documents were made classified 
until 2009. 
Government should provide 
risk mitigation measures to 
ensure project success 
Government provided too much guarantee against 
private sector’s risks to the extent the private sector is 
totally shielded from loss. 
 
Table 4.2: Good BOT Implementation Matrix and how Malaysia Compares to It 
Source : Author (from information available in various literatures) 
 
4.5 Difference Between Certain Elements in Malaysia’s and Other Countries’ 
BOT implementation Approach 
 
 To further highlight the difference in implementation approach of certain 
elements in BOT arrangement applied in Malaysia with that of other countries and 
international practices, the research will outline selected prominent traits of BOT 
scheme implemented in Malaysia and evaluate them through a comparative approach 
with the latter.  
4.5.1 No Specific Law Governing BOT Implementation in Malaysia 
 Malaysia’s BOT implementation in general and in highway development 
specifically is not governed or regulated by any specific BOT law (ADB,2000: 
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appendix 1, p.15). The enabling regulation of BOT implementation in Malaysia is a 
combination of guidelines and acts, which does not comprehensively regulate all 
aspects on its implementation. The guidelines in effect are the Malaysian Guidelines on 
Privatization (1985) and The Privatization Master Plan (1991). None of these guidelines 
functions as regulation on how the BOT process should be implemented. According to 
Hensley and White (1993), the Guideline on Privatization was more of conveying the 
message of the GoM’s aspiration of to engage in nationwide privatization initiative to 
the private sector and how the government planned to do that in a clear and precise 
manner. It is also a document which defined and expressed the government’s objectives 
and implementation approach. The GoP was successful in signaling the private sector 
about the readiness of the government to make the leap to privatization and promote 
them to participate (Hensley and white, 1993: p.73). In summary the GoP only 
contained the objectives of Malaysia’s privatization policy, the privatization forms 
adopted, identification and selection of what to be privatized, guideline on specific 
issues of privatization and the institutional setup to implement the privatization 
initiative. The Privatization Master Plan released in 1999 on the other hand is the further 
continuation of the GoP in which it explained the privatization that have took place 
since the Privatization Policy was launched, further explained the forms of privatization 
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and guidelines on matters relating to privatization. In term of implementation process, 
the PMP further clarified on how privatization projects should proceed starting from 
initiation either by the government or by the private sector. The PMP outlined that all 
government initiated privatization project should be executed with competitive bidding 
while private initiated project will be evaluated and awarded directly to the proposer 
depending on the uniqueness and the viability of the proposal (Economic Planning Unit, 
1991). However, in both documents, there is no mention about the obligation of the 
government to call for open tender or allow for other private company to submit counter 
proposal on received unsolicited proposal as the final decision on the method of 
implementation is for the government to make and the basis of selection usually “cannot 
be discerned” (Yaacob & Naidu, 1997). Other that the two guidelines, the BOT highway 
development in Malaysia is regulated by the Malaysian Federal Roads (Private 
Management) Act 1984 (also known as Act 306) specifically in the empowerment of 
private company that has been selected as concessionaire and developed the highway to 
charge toll on the users of the highway. This act is the only legally binding regulation on 
the BOT highway development in Malaysia in which it is a punishable by law for 
anyone to not pay the toll when using the BOT highway. 
 In comparison, in other countries, the implementations of BOT highway 
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projects are governed by specific BOT acts. Among the countries that have specific 
BOT acts in place are Philippines and Cambodia while some states in India like the state 
of Gujarat also have its own BOT law. The Philippines BOT Law or Republic Act no. 
6957, dated 9 July 1990 (amended by Republic Act no. 7718, dated 8 May 1994) is a 
national act “which was designed to tap into and encourages, the use of private sector 
resources to spur the construction of infrastructure facilities in aid of national 
development” (Manaligod Jr., 2008). Among others, the Philippines BOT law defined 
BOT, the type of projects that can be developed through BOT and the power vested into 
the approving government agencies according to the project cost threshold. In term of 
implementation process, the act clearly defines that all BOT project must be publicly 
tendered and the basis of selection must be the compliance to all requirements and 
submission of the lowest bid and most favourable terms (Section 5) and direct 
negotiation is only permissible under specific conditions such as only single complying 
bid is submitted or only one bidder qualified to be considered (Section 5A) (Republic 
Act no. 6957, 1990). Another developing country which has a BOT Law in place is 
Cambodia. The Cambodian BOT law 1998 or Anukret on Build-Operate-Transfer 
Contract is the law regulating the BOT practice in the nation. Similar to the Philippines 
BOT Law, the Cambodian BOT Law also clearly defined what a BOT project is and 
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what type of infrastructure can be developed through BOT approach. On the matter of 
procurement process and concessionaire selection, the Cambodian BOT Law expressed 
that all projects must be through either open or restrictive bidding (locally or 
internationally) and direct negotiation is only permissible in certain specific 
circumstances (Cambodia BOT Law, 1998: article 9, chapter 2). Another example of 
BOT law is the Gujarat Infrastructure Development Act 1999 which governed the 
implementation of BOT in the state of Gujarat in India. The main gist of the act is the 
provision of “Fair, transparent and clear-cut mechanism for selection of developers, 
either through international competitive bidding, or through direct negotiations, with the 
very strong element of transparency and competitive arrangement” (Gujarat 
Infrastructure Development Board (GIDB), 2007). 
 By comparing the circumstance of Malaysia with the other two countries, 
Philippines and Cambodia, and the state of Gujarat in India, it is clear that the 
availability of a specific, legally binding national or state level act or statute is important 
for the implementation of BOT infrastructure development. In the case of Malaysia, the 
lack of it resulted in the inclination of undertaking the direct negotiation route, as it is 
not expressed that the government is legally bound to call for competitive bidding 
approach in any of its BOT highway project. This in turn can arouse public questions 
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and concern especially concerning the issue of transparency (Fishfein & Babbar, 1996). 
In contrast, in the two nations and one state briefly reviewed, the BOT law in place 
specifically guideline the bidding and selection process for BOT infrastructure projects 
with the strict emphasis on competitive bidding regardless either openly or restrictively. 
By having the regulation in place, the public sector is bound to implement the process 
according to the stipulated conditions in the act and this can result in the countries to 
have “more favourable rating” for investors and public alike (Fishfein & Babbar,1996: 
p.7). 
4.5.2 Management of Unsolicited Proposals 
 A unique aspect of Malaysian BOT highway development is that the private 
sector is encouraged to submit project proposal to the government (Yaacob & Naidu, 
1997). The Malaysian Privatization Master Plan dictated that private sector can initiate 
privatization project by proposing to the government the infrastructure or services to be 
privatized (Economic Planning Unit, 1991: para 87). These unrequested proposals from 
the private sector are termed as Unsolicited Proposal (Hodges and Dellacha, 2007). In 
Malaysia’s BOT highway development context, the PMP has already outlined that 
unsolicited proposals are acceptable for projects that are considered unique. The 
yardsticks for measuring uniqueness of unsolicited proposals as clarified in the PMP are 
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the whether the proposal consists of a unique solution to an economic problem and offer 
with it a more economic solution to the government, potential of saving government’s 
fund and the proposal has the unique advantage of ownership of special, proprietary 
technical usage rights, copy rights or knowledge which is imperative towards the 
implementation of the proposal that cannot be offered by any other party (Economic 
Planning Unit,1991: para 89). Furthermore, the PMP have also outlined how the 
government should interact with unsolicited proposals, as clarified in para 87 which 
stated that any proposal received from the private sector shall be considered on the basis 
of “first come, first serve” principle with the aim of rewarding innovation and ingenuity 
and to promote entrepreneurship. If the proposal conform to the established guidelines 
of uniqueness and suitable for privatization, a letter of exclusivity will be accorded to 
the proposer granting it the exclusive rights to undertake feasibility studies and resubmit 
a detailed proposal to the government. Upon evaluation and decision that the proposal is 
acceptable, the government will enter into negotiation with the proposer and award the 
privatization (BOT) project to it subject to mutual agreement being attained. Basically, 
the provisions of PMP in regards of unsolicited proposal are that it is allowed and 
encouraged and the government’s role is to receive, evaluate and accept them subject to 
compliance of the specified criteria. There is no provision anywhere in the guideline 
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which enable the government to incorporate elements of competition in the management 
of unsolicited proposals. The non affirmative implementation process outlined will 
almost for certain results in the acceptance of the unsolicited proposal as it has been 
observed that “the government approves projects through direct negotiations with 
private sector parties” (Naidu, 2007: p.222). 
 Following the implementation guidelines of the PMP, the number of BOT 
highway projects in Malaysia undertaken through direct negotiation process should only 
be limited to those which were proposed by the private sector (unsolicited proposals) 
whereas the projects initiated by the government should always be offered through 
competitive bidding process, either through open or restricted tender exercises. 
However, the number of projects which was called for tender was quite low compared 
to the total number of BOT highway projects implemented so far between 1987 to now. 
Form the total of 30 highways
17
 developed utilizing BOT privatization approach, some 
of the highway projects where competitive bidding exercises were observed to be 
undertaken were the North South Expressway Project (Kleimeier, 1996: p.189) and the 
Shah Alam Expressway Project ((ADB,2000: appendix 1, p.14).
18
 On the other hand, 
                                                     
17 From MHA’s website http://www.llmnet.gov.my/serverpages/highway/highway_info.aspx 
18 The actual number of tendered highway could not be determined because of the 
unavailable information 
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the high number of BOT highway projects which were proposed by the private sector 
(unsolicited proposal) and accepted resulted in several issues raised such as the 
perception of lack of transparency and corruption. According to the PMP, unsolicited 
proposals that can be accepted and awarded should only be those which display high 
degree of uniqueness and innovation or those involving exclusive rights of certain 
technical knowledge and its use. To understand how much of the accepted unsolicited 
proposals have conformed to the guidelines of the PMP, some of the projects are 
illustrated in details in table 4.3: 
Project Length 
(km) 
Characteristics 
Ampang-Kuala 
Lumpur Elevated 
Highway (AKLEH) 
7.9 Completely new alignment. Elevated highways 
designed as the first intra urban highway. 
Designed with the aim of relieving traffic 
congestion in the city center, the alignment and 
the design of the highway were proposed fully by 
the concessionaire company. Innovative design 
with whole alignment elevated, reducing the 
problem of land acquisition. 
Guthrie Corridor 
Expressway 
25 Completely new alignment. Proposed by the 
concession company to traverse through new 
townships along its vast land banks with the aim 
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of developing them. Project was never a part 
government’s highway plan 
SPRINT (KL West 
Traffic Dispersion 
Scheme Highway) 
26 Upgrading of existing alignment and 2 new 
alignments. Highway designed to disperse traffic 
congestion in parts of KL. First urban highway to 
use double deck structure and dual 3 lanes tunnel. 
New Pantai 
Expressway 
19.6 Upgrading of existing alignment. Highway 
designed to reduce traffic congestion. 
Table 4.3 : Some cases of the private initiated BOT highways (unsolicited proposals) 
Source : Malaysian Highway Authority 
 The highways listed in table 4.3 are only small representation of the whole 
BOT highway projects in Malaysia. From the four highways listed, it is not easy to say 
that they are unique projects with high innovation which warrant their acceptance by the 
GoM. For instance, the AKLEH project can be viewed as having displayed a high 
degree of innovation (completely new alignment and all elevated structure) and offered 
an innovative solution to the problem of traffic congestion in the city center. The same 
evaluation however cannot be simply put to the New Pantai Expressway in which the 
highway alignment consisted partially of upgrading existing federal roads to highway 
status. If the guidelines of PMP on the acceptance of unsolicited proposal are strictly 
followed, the merit of uniqueness and innovative features of some of these proposals are 
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not easy to justify and their selection shows the subjectivity of the government’s 
evaluation process. 
 Unsolicited proposals in PPP infrastructure developments are also observed in 
other countries. However, a distinct difference between the management of unsolicited 
proposals in Malaysia and the other countries is that the later “have developed effective 
systems to channel unsolicited proposals into public competitive processes, thus 
providing more transparency and political legitimacy to private infrastructure” (Hodges 
& Dellacha, 2007: p.vii). For these other countries, Hodges and Dellacha (2007) 
observed that the initial process involving the receipt of unsolicited proposals does not 
diverge much from Malaysia. The process involves receiving, evaluating the merit of 
the proposal and upon acceptance of preliminary agreement from the government, the 
proposer will be granted some form of official acknowledgement on its intention to 
develop the proposed project. However, starting from this point, other countries have 
established an additional stage with the objective of incoroporating competitive bidding 
into the unsolicited proposal management process, which is tendering the unsolicited 
proposal. The three most used method in tendering the unsolicited proposal are bonus, 
Swiss challenge, or a best and final offer system (Hodges & Dellacha, 2007: p7). 
 In bonus system, the original proponent of the system is given a bonus point for 
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its oiginal proposal. The government will then call for tender the project that has been 
proposed by the proponent with full disclosure of the bonus given to the proponent and 
the proponent’s right to be repaid for its proposal development cost should other party 
wins the bidding. The original proponent will then choose whether to joint or not the 
bidding process utilizing the bonus point awarded to it. The competitive bidding will 
finally be evaluated based on lowest cost offer and if the lowest offer is no lower than 
the percentage allowed to the proponent as the bonus (for example 10%), then the 
proponent will win the bid. Countries implementing Swiss challenge system on the 
other hand will also tender the unsolicited proposal for other parties to participate. The 
original proponent in this system will not be given any bonus but instead it must match 
any lower bid offered by other companies in the tender exercise or risk losing the bid. 
Upon matching the lower bid, the original proponent will either be selected for the 
project or both bids will then be further evaluated on the basis of merit before being 
selected. The last system that has been use in tendering unsolicited proposal is the best 
and final offer system which basically is a further evolution of the bonus and Swiss 
challenge system. In this system, the unsolicited proposal is tendered and the most 
advantageous bids will be selected for a final level of bidding in which the proponent 
will also be requsted to submit their bid. The lowest bid offer and with the most merit 
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among the bids in the final round (including the proponent’s bid) will then be selected. 
According to Hodges & Dellacha (2007) countries practicing these bidding systems for 
unsolicited proposals are South Korea and Chile for bonus system, Philippines, some 
states in India, Italy, Taiwan, and the U.S territory of Guam for Swiss challenge and 
South Africa, Argentina and Costa Rica for the best and final offer system. 
 
4.5.3 Government’s measures to protect the concession company from risks 
 Risk in BOT project, like any other project, is a certainty (Bokharey, 
Vallyutham, Potty and Bakar, 2010). To mitigate the risks in BOT project, the right 
amount of assistance and guarantee by the government is crucial as it will make the 
project more attractive to the private sector to participate. Having effective risk control 
mechanisms in place will also assist in striking the right balance of risk transfer and risk 
sharing between both parties in the BOT arrangement. A well planned risk sharing 
arrangement will benefit both parties and put them in satisfactory position but in order 
to achieve this, the government should be ready to bear some of the risks while 
transfering the remainder risks to the private sector with some rewards attached to them 
(Ward & Sussman, 2005). In Malaysia’s BOT highway development, the government 
has incorporated in the process a number of supportive and protective measures aimed 
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at assisting the concession company in facing the risks and ensuring the success of the 
projects. For example, the Malaysian government provided soft loan to support project 
development (as observed in the NSE project where a suppot loan of RM 1.65 Billion is 
provided to the concessionaire), traffic volume supplement, external risk supplement 
(exchange rate and loan rate movement guarantee as observed in NSE project), and 
assistance for land acqusition payment. The toll rate in Malaysia’s highway projects are 
also allowed to be increased in determined interval and compensation will be paid by 
the GoM to the concession companies in case of non-approval of toll rate increase. In 
the case of NSE,  the most prominent of such measures and one that has been observed 
by various available literatures such as (Sahai, 2003), (Kleimeier, 1996) and (Hensley & 
White, 1993) is the minimum revenue guarantee which guarantees that the government 
will supplement any shortfall in toll collection resulting from lower than forecasted 
traffic volume. The minimum revenue guarantee and the toll rate adjustment allowance 
have resulted in the government of Malaysia paying compensation amounting to RM 
2.05 Billion for all the highways which have been operating in Malaysia between 1990 
and 2011
19
. For the NSE project alone, the culmination of minimum revenue guarantee 
                                                     
19 Minister of Works’s answer to written question posed by the Bagan constituent’s Member 
of Parliament dated 21st March 2011 (in Malay) retrieved from 
http://dapmalaysia.org/repository/20110426_konsesi.pdf 
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and compensation for postponement of toll rate increase has resulted in the 
compensation amounting RM 735.22 Million which is about 12% of the construction 
cost of the highway itself. The consequence of putting these safety nets protecting the 
concessionaire companies in the BOT highways projects form loss on one hand 
increases the projects success rate but on the other hand, it also “imply that risk has 
hardly been privatized with the government’s privatization program” (Jomo & Syn, n.d.: 
p.15). 
 The minimum revenue guarantee (or minimum income guarantee in some other 
literature) is not exclusive to BOT highway projects in Malaysia. Vassallo and Solino 
(2006) observed that minimum revenue guarantee has been incorporated in highway 
projects in Chile, Colombia, South Korea and South Africa other than Malaysia. In the 
case of Chile, the implementation of minimum revenue guarantee is different form 
Malaysia in several aspects. Firstly, in Chile, the minimum revenue guarantee is offered 
as an option to the concession company in which the company can choose either to 
except it or not. If the company choses to accept the minimum income guarantee, it will 
also have to share with the government the revenue generated should it exceed the 
forecasted amount. If the concessionaire refused the minimum revenue guarantee, it will 
have to absorb all traffic volume risk by itself. Secondly, the main principle behind the 
127 
 
implementation of minimum revenue guarantee in Chile is that there is a sharing of 
revenue between the concessionaire and the government (Vassallo and Solino, 2006: 
p.18). This is in contrast to Malaysia in which there is no allocation for revenue sharing 
between the government and the concession company. As a result, the government ends 
up shouldering most of the financial risk involved in the BOT highway development 
project (Fishfein & Babbar, 1996: p.14) 
 The practice of Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) applied in Malaysia for 
example in the NSE project where it is incorporated in the concession agreement is that 
the government agrees to absorb and compensate the concessionaire company in the 
event of the actual toll collection revenue falls below the projected revenue. Joe (2009) 
clarified that for the NSE project, the agreed toll collection revenue projection for the 
year 1997 and onwards is RM 2 Billion per annum. However, based on another traffic 
projection study done by another consultant (Rendel, Palmer & Tritton), the toll 
collection revenue was only projected at RM 800 million and the GoM was obligated to 
compensate the balance RM 1.2 Billion to PLUS as agreed in the concession agreement. 
This flaw in the implementation of MRG in Malaysia’s BOT highway development 
means the GoM has to shield the concession company up to 100% of the shortfall 
between projected and actual income, which is something not practiced in other 
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countries. The practice of MRG in South Korea based on the information from MKIF 
website
20
 is between the threshold of 70% to 90% and subject to change according to 
five year period. Vassallo & Solino (2006) stated that in the practice of MRG in Chile, 
the threshold is at 70%. The difference between the practice of MRG in Malaysia, South 
Korea and Chile is obvious and this results in the government of Malaysia shouldering 
all the income shortfall of the concession company and in turn virtually guaranteeing 
the concession company from financial loss. 
 
4.6 The Connection and Effect of The Traits To Malaysia’s BOT Highway 
Development 
 Malaysia’s BOT highway implentation program is noted to have incorporated 
three traits that have been discussed which are the lack of specific BOT law to govern 
and regulate it, management of unsolicited proposals and over protection of 
concessionaire from financial risks. These three traits or characteristics are in a way 
interconnected and have a serious effect to the implementation of highway through BOT 
arrangement in Malaysia. The lack of specific, legally empowered act to regulate BOT 
project will not provide the GoM any specific basis to implement BOT highway project 
                                                     
20 
http://www.macquarie.com/mgl/mkif/en/mkif-assets/minimum-revenue-guarantee-summary 
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in a transparent and objective manner. What has happened and observed in Malaysia’s 
highway projects are the use of discretion and subjective evaluation methods, allowing 
the projects to be implemented in manners not postitively contributing towards the 
original objectives of privatization of reducing government’s financial burden and 
increase efficiency. Furthermore, the lack of BOT law also allowed for questionable 
decisions being made which were somewhat being passed as methods for achieving 
national policy. Consqeuently, the non availability of strict regulatory rules on how BOT 
should be implemented opened the door for too many projects being designed and 
proposed without following the national highway development plan and being approved 
because there is no specific basis to disallow them. With no concrete regulation on how 
to incorporate competition into unsolicited proposals, the government is put on the 
position of having to accept all bona fide unsolicited proposals even though they are not 
the most economic options.  
 With no BOT law in place and the propensity to over protect the private 
company in BOT project from financial risks, the Malaysian government have created a 
system which allows companies with insufficient experience, technical knowledge and 
relatively unstrong financial condition to successfully bid or propose highway 
privatization and be selected for the project. The consequence of these traits can best be 
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observed in the NSE project where the lowest ranked bidder was awarded the 
concession and the government have to continuously support the project in various 
ways to ensure its success. The culmination of all these traits and the government 
disclosure policy on its decision made have resulted in Malaysia achieving its goal of 
highway infrastructure privatization on one hand but not obtaining the best option in 
project and economic term on the other hand. Handley (1997) noted that in the context 
of Malaysia’s BOT highway, “several questions need to be raised as to the success of 
achieving the basic goals of privatization” (p.239). 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Malaysia’s BOT Highway Project Implementation As A Process 
 The research has been undertaken to analyse how does Malaysia implement its 
BOT highway development project and how does the implementation method viewed as 
a process. As such, the answer of this research question is two fold in which one is on 
how Malaysia implement the BOT highway development method and two, does the 
implementation fit as a systematic process. Through analysis using a suggested process 
model from available literature, it can be concluded that the implementation of BOT 
highway development in Malaysia is fit as a systematic process. This is exemplified by 
the effectiveness of the process in attaining the final output of provision of operational 
highway infrastructure. As a process, the implementation method is usable and 
repeatable in the Malaysian context as it has been proven in all the highway 
development projects undertaken in Malaysia between 1985 to now. However, the 
efficiency of the process is jeopardised by some weakness in the controlling procedures 
that is in the selection of concessionaire, management of unsolicited proposals and 
improper management of revenue guarantee. Throughout the research, the recurring 
finding is that Malaysia’s implementation of highway development as well as other 
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privatization endeavor has been utilized as a method of achieving Malaysia’s national 
economic policy. As such, some of the procedures and actions in the process have been 
tailored to suit the policy resulting in questionable practices which in turn effects the 
efficiency of the process. As a whole, the process of implementing BOT system of 
highway development in Malaysia is a relatively good and sound process which concur 
to Davis’ suggestion of delivering somehing of value to parties internal and external of 
the process (2009). 
 Viewing the implementation method as a systematic process and understanding 
the reason behind some of the procedures in the process also allow the comprehension 
of why these certain procedures differ from the process used in other countries, thus 
answering the second research question. Assessing the underlying objectives of 
Malaysia in promoting equal economic growth for all of its major racial groups clearly 
shows the cause and effect of the differences in implementation process of BOT 
highway between Malaysia and other countries as discussed in chapter 4.  
 
5.2 Malaysia’s BOT Highway Project : Successful Implemention or Failure 
 This research has analyzed the implementation process of BOT highway 
development in Malaysia. The development, enabled by the Malaysian Privatization 
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Policy have seen more than 1600 kilometers of highway being constructed and in 
operation in Malaysia in a time span of about 25 years. This achivement is not so 
significant if compared to countries like India which have succesfully completed 70,934 
kilometer of highway to date. However, due consideration must also be made on the 
relative size of Malaysia as opposed to India. The accomplishment of Malaysia in 
developing its highway network must be viewed objectively with consideration about its 
privatization objectives in the first place. The highway privatization intiative undertaken 
has reduced the administrative burden of the government which can be seen in the 
change of responsibility of the MHA from the implementation to the supervision of 
Malaysian highways (Santhiman, 2011). In term of financial burden, the PMP  
reported that BOT and BOO projects implemented (including highways) up to 1991 
have resulted in the savings of about RM 8.2 Billion (Economic Planning Unit, 1991)  
and the amount of capital expenditure saving achieved by the whole privatization 
exercise (inclusive of BOT highway development) between 1983 and 2009 is RM 161 
Billion
21
.   
 However, the evaluation of success or failure of the implementation of BOT 
highway development in Malaysia should not be based solely on the achievement of 
                                                     
21 From 3PU’ website http://www.ukas.gov.my/web/guest/background 
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Malaysia’s privatization objectives. Objective review should be made on all other 
aspects of the impementation. From these reviews conducted, glaring findings have 
been made on aspects of implementation which does not fit well with the success story 
of the highway projects. Hensley & White (1993) for example found that the process of 
highway privatization in Malaysia lacking in transparency and selection of concession 
company was made on the basis of connection with the top members of the government. 
ADB (2000) has observed that in Malaysia’s case, the privatization has benefited the 
private sector more than the government as the private sector has been making profit 
while succesfully shielded from any major risk at the expense of the government. Jomo 
& Syn (n.d.) questioned the consequences of having ‘contingent liabilities’ in highway 
and other infrastructure projects which has effectively ensured risk free revenue 
generation for the concessionaire while simulatenously requiring continuos financial 
support form the government. Handley (1997) raised the question of whether the 
success in term of getting the highway developed warrants the practice of awarding 
concession with no competitive basis and with non transparent process heavily 
favouring politically linked companies. 
 As such, to determine whether the BOT highway development in Malaysia is a 
success or failure requires a careful, balanced evaluation of what has been perceived as 
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success and what has been the opposite. If the success is only measured by the end 
product, functioning, interconnected networks of high quality highway connecting the 
cities and rural areas in Malaysia, allowing efficent transportation of people and goods; 
then it can be said that BOT highway development in Malaysia has been a resounding 
success. However, if the sustainability of the model is being used as the yardstick in 
measuring the succes, then the implementation model applied in Malaysia is far from 
succesful. It is difficult to term the Malaysian BOT highway development a success if 
the government have to provide continuous protection to the concession company to 
shield it from risk while simultaneously guaranteeing the latter’s profit. Furthermore, 
the unbalanced and lopsided arrangement of the implementation model will reduce and 
eventually cancel out any benefit of privatization that the government hoped to achieve 
such as reducing its financial burden. The reality is with the ongoing financial support 
in term of financial compensation and allowed toll rate increase, the financial benefit of 
highway privatization to the government will be very insignificant. 
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5.3 Policy Recommendations 
 The BOT highway development in Malaysia is a case of mixed success. Based 
on the analysis of this research, several policy recommendations can be drawn to further 
strengthen the implementation process of BOT highway development among them are: 
 Establishing a specific BOT law – the finding of this research have shown that 
the lack of a regulatory BOT law in Malaysia has resulted in the difficulty in 
implementing highway privatization exercise effectively. The void in governing 
regulation have encouraged the use of discretion and subjective evaluation as 
basis of selection, approval and awardance of BOT highway projects. With a 
proper BOT law in place outlining all aspects of its implementation, the process 
from inception until the transfer back to the government can be vastly improved. 
 Setting up a dedicated BOT highway implementation agency – The current 
setup for BOT highway development in Malaysia involves several government 
agencies undertaking various roles which sometimes overlapped. This condition 
causes bureaucracy and delay in decision making. Therefore, establishing a 
central agency and unifying all the responsibilities for BOT implementation 
under the agency will greatly enhance efficiency in its implementation process. 
 Better management of unsolicited proposals – The existing implementation 
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process in Malaysia allows for unsolicited proposal to be submitted for the 
government’s consideration and most of the time, the evaluation result favours 
the proponents of such proposals. Upon careful review, it is clear that a number 
of the highway projects which resulted from unsolicited proposals lack the 
innovation and unique features to justify its selection. Some of the projects are 
simple upgrading of existing alignment or construction of short strecth of 
at-grade highway which does not require special technical know how or 
proprietary technology and can simply be implemented under conventional 
procurement system. Thus, it is recommended that the criteria for unsolicited 
proposals be tightened such as limiting it only for highly innovative project and 
brownfield projects such as water supply infrastructure. 
 Increase competition and transparency – Highway projects undertaken under 
the existing BOT framework in Malaysia has shown very little amount of 
competitive element and transparency. The preference of the Malaysian 
government towards direct negotiation has resulted in increased perception of 
corruption and mismanagement. Therefore, for future BOT highway projects, 
competitive bidding process should be made mandatory and all decision of the 
government should be made public. 
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 Review of the existing risk sharing policy – The current setup of risk sharing 
heavily favours the private sector and burden the government. This is clearly 
shown by the excessive provision of risk guarantee for the concession company 
which virtually shield them from all risks at the expense of the government. 
Provision such as determined toll rate increase every three or five years, 
minimum traffic guarantee and compensation against financial loss should be 
carefully reviewed and replaced by other provisions which ensure balanced and 
fair risk sharing between both parties. 
 
5.4 Future Directions 
 This research has highlighted the implementation process of BOT highway 
development in Malaysia and what are its features and how they effect the 
implementation as a whole. However, due to the limitations as previously described, the 
research could only managed to come out with the critical review of the process and and 
how has it defined the implementation, resulting in the mixed view of its success/failure 
perception. As such, for future research, it will be beneficial if an empirical approach 
can be taken to study the relation between the implementation characteristics and the 
success or failure rate based on the available data of highway construction cost, revenue 
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generated, amount of compensation given so far and other quantitative parameters 
involved. Perhaps, with such approach, it will clearly show whether the existing  
implementation of BOT higway in Malaysia has indeed been a success or otherwise. 
 For the future direction of BOT highway development in Malaysia itself, 
perhaps it is best summarised by Santhiman (2011) who outlined these characterisics as 
the future direction; namely, new implementation model which does not burden the 
government and the people while at the same time guaranteeing private sector revenue, 
implementing public participation in the planning stage, General Bond offer instead of 
government compensation to the concessionaire, evaluation of highway with outcome 
based evaluation method, sustainable highway development with green technology and 
Value For Money emphasis and implementation of open, competitive tender or Request 
For Proposal to ensure fully competitve price and transparency. 
 However, all these recommendations for future direction of Malaysia’s 
implementation of BOT method in its highway development will not make any 
significant change unless concrete measures are taken in improving the concessionaire 
selection and restructuring the subsidy and guarantee system. As the research have 
highlighted the continuous propensity of Malaysia to allow for usolicited proposal, 
these two measures are important in ensuring a more effective implementation and 
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better achievement of efficiency. Based on the methods discussed in the research, 
Malaysia’s selection of concessionaire will be better off if modelled after the methods 
used in Korea, India and Chile whereas competition is introduced in unsolicited 
proposal through approaches of tendering, Swiss Challenge or Bonus system instead of 
the current approach of single party evaluation. On the matter of subsidy and guarantee, 
Malaysia’s practise of providing full guarantee against concessionaire’s loss through 
excessive minimum revenue guarantee, soft loan and support must be improved by 
taking cue from the practices of other nations such as Korea and Chile which capped 
their revenue gurantee at some threshold not amounting to 100% and from India’s 
practise of awarding to concessionaire which requires the least amount of subsidy from 
the government. Even with the incorporation of national policy into the privatization 
endeavor of Malaysia, strong political will to adopt these measures will enable a more 
efficient implementation of highway development using BOT method and effective 
achievement of its privatization objectives. 
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